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ABSTRACT
Big data's predictive algorithms have the potential to
revolutionize the criminal justice system. They can make far more
accurate determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable
cause, thus increasing both the efficiency and the fairness of the
system, since fewer innocent people will be stopped and searched.
However, three significant obstacles remain before the
criminal justice system can formally use predictive algorithms to
help make these determinations. First, we need to ensure that neither
the algorithms nor the data used are based on improper factors, such
as the race of the suspect. Second, under Fourth Amendment law,
individualized suspicion is an essential element of reasonable
suspicion or probable cause. This means that either the predictive
algorithms must be designed to take individualized suspicion into
account, or the predictive algorithms can only be used as one factor
in determining whether the legal standard has been met, forcing
police and judges to combine the algorithms' results with
individualized factors. And finally, the legal standards themselves
must be quantified so that police and judges can use the numerical
predictions of big data in their reasonable suspicion and probable
cause determinations.
These obstacles are not insurmountable. And if the necessary
changes are made, the criminal justice system will become far more
transparent, since the factors the algorithms take into consideration
will necessarily be reviewable by judges and the general public
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alike. Furthermore, setting a quantified likelihood for reasonable
suspicion and probable cause will allow us to engage in a healthy
debate about what those numbers ought to be, and it will also ensure
conformity across different jurisdictions.
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INTRODUCTION
The criminal justice system has always been concerned with
predictions.' Police officers on patrol predict which suspects are
1. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING,
POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 17-18 (2007) ("The truth is, most
criminal justice determinations rest on probabilistic reasoning. The jury's verdict at
trial, for instance, is nothing more than a probabilistic determination of prior fact. So
is a police officer's determination whether there is sufficient cause to search or
arrest a suspect; a judge's decision whether a suspect was coerced to confess; or
even a forensic laboratory's conclusion regarding a DNA match-or DNA
exoneration."). Professor Harcourt goes on to draw a sharp distinction between the
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engaged in criminal activity in order to determine where to focus
their investigative efforts. Magistrates deciding whether to grant a
search warrant predict the odds that contraband will be found based
on the facts presented in a warrant application. Judges conducting
bail hearings predict the chances that a defendant will return to court
for trial, and sentencing judges try to determine whether a convicted
defendant is likely to reoffend if he is given a nonincarceration
sentence.
Since the inception of our criminal justice system, law
enforcement officers and judges have relied primarily on experience,
training, intuition, and common sense in making their predictions.2 In
response, courts have crafted broad standards to accommodate these
subjective judgments and allow for flexibility in application. For
example, police officers may briefly detain an individual if they
reasonably believe that "criminal activity may be afoot,"3 while
magistrates should issue a warrant if "a man of prudence and caution
[believes] that the offense has been committed."4
The broad, flexible nature of these standards is no accident:
They have been intentionally left imprecise by generations of courts.
One reason is the nearly infinite number of different facts that could
arise in any criminal case, which make hard and fast rules rather
impractical.5 But the main reason these rules have been kept
necessary probabilistic decisions that are inherent in the criminal justice system and
what he calls the "actuarial" determinations that are derived from "statistical
correlations between group traits and group criminal offending rates," which should
be avoided if at all possible. Id. at 18.
2. There were certainly scattered examples of statistical prediction
instruments before the big data era. Statistical prediction methods were developed as
early as 1935 to determine the likelihood of a prisoner's success if paroled; by the
late twentieth century similar statistical prediction instruments were being used by
dozens of states. Id. at 1, 7-9. Likewise, in the 1970s and 1980s federal Drug
Enforcement Administration officers used "drug courier profiles" to determine
which passengers at airports to investigate. Id at 15-16. But the rise of big data, with
its vast amounts of information and vastly powerful methods of processing that data,
brings the promise (or the threat) of a true revolution in the sophistication and the
proliferation of these tools.
3. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
4. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925). Occasionally
specific, recurring fact patterns lead to more specific applications of these rules: For
example, police officers know that if they observe a suspect fleeing from them while
in a high crime neighborhood, those two factors result in reasonable suspicion that
the suspect has committed a crime. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25
(2000).
5. The Supreme Court has explained that "probable cause is a fluid
concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts-
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ambiguous is that police and courts have historically lacked the
necessary tools to evaluate the accuracy of their predictions with any
precision. Thus, state actors have been forced to rely on their own
subjective beliefs and anecdotal evidence in making their
predictions.6
All of that is now changing. Modem methods of data collection
and analysis commonly known as "big data" are providing police
and judges with tools that can predict future behavior with greater
precision than ever before.' These tools hold out the promise of
increased fairness and greater objectivity at many of the critical
decision points in our criminal justice system. But despite the
potential of big data tools, three significant obstacles potentially bar
their effective incorporation into the criminal justice system.
First, we need to ensure that the tools of big data are not hard-
wired to produce discriminatory results. If the predictive algorithms
consider race or religion as a factor, then using these algorithms to
predict behavior is unacceptable (and illegal) no matter how much
they may increase accuracy. Similarly, if the algorithms themselves
were developed based on past discriminatory practices, we need to
develop new algorithms based on better data.
Second, Fourth Amendment law mandates that decisions to
stop or search a suspect be based at least in part on individualized
suspicion. Because big data involves processing large amounts of
information, its algorithms frequently generate predictions based on
broad generalizations rather than specific conduct. Thus, in their
current form, these algorithms cannot n their own form the basis for
reasonable suspicion or probable cause.
And finally, the current legal standards that govern police
officers and judges are imprecise and subjective. Courts have
deliberately created them to be imprecise and seem to have every
intention of keeping them that way. Unfortunately, these nebulous
standards are a poor fit for big data's highly precise and quantitative
tools.
These obstacles are not insurmountable barriers. Big data
algorithms can be structured so that they are truly race neutral and
not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983).
6. For example, a magistrate might reasonably conclude that a defendant
who does not have a steady job seems less likely to come back to court on her own;
furthermore, last month the magistrate remembers releasing a defendant who did not
have a steady job and sure enough, she did not appear for her court date.
7. See infra Part I.
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take into account individualized conduct when making their
calculations. But in order to ensure that they meet these
requirements, the factors they apply must be transparent o judges. In
other words, it is not sufficient for reviewing courts to know that
these algorithms are working; the courts must also understand
exactly how the methods work to ensure that those methods meet the
appropriate legal standards.' And although courts have historically
been reluctant to attach specific numbers to the relevant legal
standards, there is no doctrinal barrier to doing so. Courts may be
more willing to take this step as they come to realize that big data
offers highly precise and quantitative tools that can create not only
better accuracy but also greater transparency in our criminal system.
This Article seeks to harmonize the analytical world of big data
with the legal world of criminal justice. If those who design the big
data tools can ensure the transparency of their algorithms and
databases, not only will these tools become more palatable to the
courts, but the transparency of these calculations will simultaneously
improve the transparency of the criminal justice system. Moreover, if
courts embrace the use of numerically quantifiable data, not only will
we achieve greater accuracy in the administration of justice, but we
will also achieve greater clarity of the process.
Part I of this Article discusses the ways in which big data can
increase the accuracy of our criminal justice system.9 Part II
addresses the challenges involved in the use of big data. Part III
explains how these challenges can be overcome by requiring
heightened transparency of big data's algorithms and databases and
by introducing quantifiable standards into our criminal justice
system." The Article concludes by positing that big data tools, if
properly designed and used, can dramatically improve both the
accuracy and transparency of our criminal justice system.
8. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable
Suspicion, 62 EMORY L.J. 259, 319-20 (2012). Unfortunately, as these algorithms
become more accurate, they also become more complicated, and the databases they
use become even larger and more detailed, making them less comprehensible to the
average police officer or judge. We will consider this problem in more detail in
Section III.A.
9. See infra Part I.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part III.
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I. THE PROMISE OF BIG DATA: INCREASED ACCURACY
"Big data" is the practice of accumulating extraordinarily large
amounts of information from a variety of different sources and then
processing that information using statistical analysis.12 The results of
these analyses are termed "mechanical predictions" in contrast with
subjective "clinical judgments," which are based on the individual
decision-maker's past experience and knowledge.13
Private companies have been using big data for over a decade
to predict consumer behavior. Retailers use it to determine and
change shopping habits.4 insurance companies rely on big data to try
to identify the safest drivers and healthiest people in their customer
pool. 5 Banks and credit agencies use big data to determine the
likelihood that a potential borrower is a credit risk.16 And all sorts of
companies buy and sell this data to each other, seeking to mine it for
information about their customers that they can use for economic
advantage."
In the criminal law context, mechanical predictions can be used
to assist decision-makers in making the judgment calls that are
integral to the criminal justice system. The extraordinary promise of
applying big data to the criminal justice system is based on two
12. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable
Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 352-53 (2015).
13. See William M. Grove et al., Clinical Versus Mechanical Prediction: A
Meta-Analysis, 12 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 19, 19 (2000).
14. A famous Forbes story reported that Target had used big data from
seemingly random purchasing to determine that a minor customer was pregnant and
then sent the customer coupons for pregnancy and new baby items before the
teenager had notified her parents that she was pregnant. See Kashmir Hill, How
Target Figured Out a Teen Girl Was Pregnant Before Her Father Did, FORBES
(Feb. 16, 2012, 11:02 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhil/2012/02/16/ how-
target-figured-out-a-teen-girl-was-pregnant-before-her-father-did/#3363735834c6
[https://perma.cc/BA2Q-8HK4].
15. See Brian Fung, The Big Data of Bad Driving, and How Insurers Plan
to Track Your Every Turn, WASH. POST (Jan. 4, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/01/04/the-big-data-of-bad-driving-and-how-insurers-
plan-to-track-your-every-turn/ [https://perma.cc/999Q-K9TZ].
16. See EVA WOLKOWITZ & SARAH PARKER, BIG DATA, BIG POTENTIAL:
HARNESSING DATA TECHNOLOGY FOR THE UNDERSERVED MARKET 11 (2015), http://
www.morganstanley.com/sustainableinvesting/pdf/Big Data Big Potential.pdf [https://
perma.cc/DY42-K2Q7].
17. See Meta S. Brown, When and Where to Buy Consumer Data (and 12





aspects of these mechanical predictions. First, the underlying data is
usually gathered from public sources, and therefore, the use of such
data does not constitute a "search" under the Fourth Amendment.
Thus, law enforcement officers have a significant amount of freedom
in acquiring this information, which means that they can obtain the
predictions from big data without needing to meet any legal standard
such as reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Essentially, big data
algorithms can be seen as a force multiplier, allowing police to
generate more predictive power from the same public information
that has always been available to them.
The second enticing aspect ofbig data's mechanical predictions
is that they are more accurate than clinical judgments. Studies have
shown that big data's mechanical predictions are, on average, 10%
more accurate than clinical predictions.'9 Police officers and judges
who have adopted these methods have been seeing increased
accuracy in many different contexts, ranging from predicting where
crime is likely to occur to determining which defendants are most
likely to succeed if released on parole.20 The increased accuracy
offered by big data will lead to both greater efficiency and fairness.
The system will be more efficient because police and courts will be
able to focus their resources more effectively. It will be fairer
because innocent people will be less likely to be stopped, frisked,
searched, or arrested if big data can successfully narrow the field of
legitimate suspects.
Big data's predictive algorithms could be used in a number of
different ways in the criminal justice system. First, law enforcement
officers could use these tools to determine where crime is likely to
occur and to allocate their resources accordingly; as we will see in
Section I.A, police are already using big data tools for this purpose,
18. Recently, there have been signs that the Fourth Amendment may be
expanded so that the gathering or processing of massive amounts of public data may
be considered a search. Although government surveillance of public places, or of
publicly available sources, does not implicate the Fourth Amendment, see, e.g.,
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983), the Supreme Court has hinted
at the possibility that gathering and processing large amounts of information from
public sources to learn information about a suspect could implicate the Fourth
Amendment through the "mosaic" theory, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945,
954-55 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring), but that doctrine has not yet gained
widespread acceptance in courts. For an overview and a critique of the mosaic
theory, see Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH.
L. REV. 311 (2012).
19. Grove et al., supra note 13, at 19.
20. See infra notes 22-27, 69-71 and accompanying text.
953
Michigan State Law Review
with notable success. Second, the results from these predictive
algorithms could informally influence police officers when they
make their clinical judgments about whether reasonable suspicion or
probable cause exists; as I argue in Section I.B, this is probably
already occurring. Third, police could formally cite the results from
predictive algorithms in court when justifying their stops or searches
or when applying for a search warrant. As we see in Section I.C,
there is as yet no evidence that law enforcement has done this,
although this is likely to happen soon. Finally, the results from big
data's predictive algorithms could be outcome determinative,
meaning that a police officer or a judge would only consider the
algorithm's output and ignore all other evidence. We are a long way
from this point in the context of reasonable suspicion or probable
cause, but Section I.D notes that some courts are coming close to
allowing mechanical predictions to be outcome determinative for
bail, sentencing, and parole decisions.2 1
A. Predictive Algorithms and Policing
Police have a long history of using massive amounts of data to
help decide where to deploy resources.22 In the 1990s, law
enforcement use of data compilation gained national attention with
the New York Police Department's COMPSTAT program.23 Crime
mapping algorithms quickly spread to other cities and became a
staple of big-city policing.24 Today, more advanced software has
21. There is likely to be enormous resistance to adopting a system that is
outcome determinative in any of these contexts, though I will argue that such an
option is preferable in certain contexts. See infra Section III.B.
22. For an excellent overview of the use of predictive algorithms by police
officers, see Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
23. See Sewell Chan, Why Did Crime Fall in New York City?, N.Y. TIMES
CITY RooM (Aug. 13, 2007, 2:10 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/08/
13/why-did-crime-fall-in-new-york-city/? r-2 [https://perma.cc/2HS9-E27E].
24. In addition to New York, sophisticated crime-mapping software has
been used in Los Angeles, St. Louis, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Washington, D.C.,
Oakland, and many other cities. See Stuart Wolpert, Predictive Policing
Substantially Reduces Crime in Los Angeles During Months-Long Test, UCLA
NEWSROOM (Oct. 7, 2015), http://newsroom.ucla.edu/releases/predictive-policing-
substantially-reduces-crime-in-los-angeles-during-months-long-test [https://perma.cc/
3PTX-JXK6]; Maurice Chammah, Policing the Future, VERGE (Feb. 3, 2016),
http://www.theverge.com/2016/2/3/10895804/st-louis-police-hunchlab-predictive-
policing-marshall-project [https://perma.cc/X7UZ-Y4XP]; Darwin Bond-Graham &
Ali Winston, All Tomorrow's Crimes: The Future of Policing Looks a Lot Like
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made crime-predicting software available in smaller jurisdictions,
and the National Institute of Justice is funding research into the
efficacy of such programs.25
These crime prediction software systems vary considerably in
their sophistication. One program known as PredPol (short for
"predictive policing") only looks at past reports of criminal activity
and then highlights areas of the precinct in which crime has been
most prevalent during specific time periods.26 The police department
then assigns more officers to the high-crime areas in order to detect
or deter crime more effectively. Police officers using the software in
a suburb of Los Angeles saw their crime rate decrease by 13% over
the course of four months, while it rose by 0.4% in surrounding
areas.27 A more sophisticated program called HunchLab also uses
reports of past criminal activity, but adds in additional factors.28
Some of these extra factors, such as the proximity to subway stations
or bars, or the current weather conditions, have an obvious
correlation to particular types of criminal activity. Other factors seem
unrelated, such as the decrease in aggravated assaults on windy days,
or the increase in car thefts near schools.29
The Fresno Police Department uses crime prediction software
in a somewhat different way, employing a software system called
Beware to warn police officers of the threat level for the location of a
Good Branding, SF WEEKLY (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.sfweekly.com/sanfrancisco/
all-tomorrows-crimes-the-future-of-policing-looks-a-lot-like-good-branding/Content?
oid=2827968 [https://perma.cc/2ARE-MFS2]; Eugene K. Chow, Is Predictive Policing
Making Minority Report a Reality?, WEEK (Oct. 7, 2013), http://theweek.com/
articles/459396/predictive-policing-making-minority-report-reality [https://perma.cc/
3X7W-R3VG]; Darwin Bond-Graham, Oakland Mayor Schaaf and Police Seek
Unproven 'Predictive Policing' Software, E. BAY EXPRESS (June 24, 2015), http://
www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/oakland-mayor-schaaf-and-police-seek-unproven-
predictive-policing-software/Content?oid=4362343 [https://perma.cc/99HG-MYPA].
25. See Chammah, supra note 24.
26. Id; see Cameron Albert-Deitch, Predictive Policing Crime Prevention
Software Successful for APD, ATLANTA MAGAZINE (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.
atlantamagazine.com/news-culture-articles/predictive-policing-crime-prevention-software-
successful-for-apd/ [https://perma.cc/F8YY-2JRE]. PredPol is now being used by more
than fifty different police agencies in the United States and Britain. See Chammah,
supra note 24.
27. See Chammah, supra note 24. Other jurisdictions have seen similar
improvements in crime rates: Norcross, Georgia, saw a 20% decrease in crime after
adopting PredPol, which led the Atlanta police department o adopt it as well. See
Albert-Deitch, supra note 26.
28. See Chammah, supra note 24.
29. Id.
955
Michigan State Law Review
911 call.3 0 As law enforcement officers are on their way to the
location, workers in police headquarters plug the address into the
Beware program, which quickly analyzes countless pieces of data,
including "arrest reports, . . . commercial databases, deep Web
searches and . . . social media postings" that are associated with that
address.3 1 The program then offers a rating for the location: green for
safe, yellow for caution, and red for dangerous.3 2 Police officers who
arrive at the scene can take appropriate precautions based on that
rating.
Chicago takes this process one step further, using predictive
software to determine which individuals are most likely to be
involved in a crime.3 3 Using a special algorithm designed by an
engineer at the Illinois Institute of Technology, the Chicago Police
Department created a "heat list" of 400 people who are "most likely
to be involved in a shooting or homicide."3 4 Police will then deploy
resources to monitor these individuals more closely than other
individuals3 5 in an attempt to deter their criminal behavior by letting
them know they are under increased surveillance or to swiftly
apprehend them if they do commit crimes.36
30. Justin Jouvenal, The New Way Police Are Surveilling You: Calculating






33. Matt Stroud, The Minority Report: Chicago's New Police Computer
Predicts Crimes, But Is It Racist?, VERGE (Feb. 19, 2014, 9:31 AM), http://www.
theverge.com/2014/2/19/541 9854/the-minority-report-this-computer-predicts-crime-
but-is-it-racist [https://perma.cc/J6VQ-Q64E].
34. Id.; see also Robert L. Mitchell, Predictive Policing Gets Personal,
COMPUTERWORLD (Oct. 24, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/
2486424/government-it/predictive-policing-gets- personal.html [https://perma.cc/6SR9-
4QGW] (describing a similar program in North Carolina).
35. Stroud, supra note 33.
36. Id. Kansas City has been using a similar program, known as KC NoVA,
which targets individuals "at risk" of committing violent crimes. The program warns
these individuals that they are being watched and that "harsh penalties will be
imposed for even petty slights once warnings have been given," but it also provides
services such as housing and social services to help the individuals stay out of
trouble. See John Eligon & Timothy Williams, Police Program Aims to Pinpoint





Using predictive software to determine how to allocate scarce
law enforcement resources i not limited to investigations of street
crime. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) uses a secret algorithm to
determine which of the over one hundred million tax returns should
be audited each year. The IRS algorithm scans through every tax
return, looking for outlying levels of deductions or other factors that
indicate a higher chance of fraud, and then it assigns a risk level to
each return.3 7 Those returns with high risk factors are then personally
reviewed by IRS agents to see if an audit is appropriate.38
Some critics of adapting big data to our criminal justice system
argue that it does not, in fact, make more accurate decisions.
Professor Bernard Harcourt has argued that predictive policing may
actually reduce the efficiency of stops and searches, because when
police focus their resources on certain portions of the population,
they necessarily withdraw resources from other portions of the
population.3 9 According to his model, crime will decrease among
those who are targeted, but it will increase among those who are not
targeted; thus, whether the overall crime rate decreases actually
depends on the comparative elasticity of the crime rate in each of the
two groups.40 This critique is persuasive if the police are using a very
basic predictive policing model that focuses on one specific
neighborhood or (as in Harcourt's example) one specific race. But
the critique becomes weaker if the police are using a multi-factor
algorithm to direct resources, and it becomes weaker still if it is
merely used to determine whether reasonable suspicion or probable
cause exist. However, Harcourt's objection does highlight the need
to ensure that the data used by the predictive algorithm remains
current; that is, if there is a feedback effect hat makes certain factors
less likely to indicate criminal activity, the algorithm should be
adjusted to ensure that those factors are given less weight or
eliminated entirely. It also highlights a legitimate concern about
relying on data which itself may be tainted by past discrimination or
inaccurate decisions, a topic we will address in Section III.A below.
37. See HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 10.
38. Id.
39. Id. ch. 4.
40. Id. at 123.
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B. Predictive Algorithms as Background Data
PredPol, Hunchlab, Beware, Chicago's "heat list," and the IRS
algorithm represent what we could call the first stage of crime
prediction algorithms-algorithms used to help police decide where
and how to deploy their resources, but not used (at least formally) to
make any specific legal determination.4 1 But as the amount of data
about individuals grows and becomes more accessible, police will
use big data at later stages of the criminal justice system. It is likely
that police already informally use these tools as background
information in making their determination as to whether reasonable
suspicion or probable cause exists.
Assume a police officer observes marginally suspicious
activity-say, a suspect walking slowly down the street at night,
peering into windows and constantly looking over his shoulder. If the
officer is using crime prediction software, and the software informs
her that she is currently in a low crime neighborhood with few
burglaries, she may simply assume that the suspect is engaged in
innocent conduct and merely observe the suspect for a few minutes
until he leaves the area. But if the software informs her that there are
many burglaries that occur in this neighborhood at this time of night,
that extra factor could be enough to change her response and lead her
to conduct a Terry stop of the suspect. Or consider a police officer
who uses risk assessment software and shows up at a home in
response to a 911 call to find two individuals engaged in a heated
argument, one with a bruise on his cheek. The injured individual
refuses to tell the police officer whether he has been assaulted. If the
risk assessment software flashes a peaceful green, the responding
officer might simply give a warning to the two individuals or ask one
of them to take a walk to cool down. But if the software presented a
red light, indicating the presence of a violent individual at the
location, the officer might decide that she has probable cause to
arrest the uninjured individual and charge him with assault.
The same calculus would occur-consciously or
unconsciously-when an officer is investigating a potential crime
and a member of a heat list is a suspect, or when an IRS agent is
reviewing a return that has already been flagged by the software.
Other police officers have mobile applications that can display the
41. Another example of law enforcement using big data to try to detect
criminal activity is the National Security Agency's massive metadata collection
program. See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 792, 816-17 (2d Cir. 2015).
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location of individuals suspected of gang activity, registered sex
offenders, or those who have outstanding warrants, thus allowing a
police officer to quickly generate reasonable suspicion or probable
cause.4 2 Indeed, presence in a "high crime area" is a factor that is
frequently cited by police officers who are explaining why they
believed that reasonable suspicion existed,4 3 and the fact that a
suspect is a known violent felon could also be used by an officer in
deciding whether to make an arrest.4 4 Many law enforcement agents
(and many lay people) would say that it would be foolish to ignore
these signals when deciding on the appropriate course of action.
Although police probably use these results as background
information in making their determination, so far no law
enforcement agent or prosecutor has formally used the results of
crime prediction software in court as a factor to support reasonable
suspicion or probable cause.4 5 Instead, courts rely on the testimony of
the law enforcement officers to establish the necessary factors, even
in situations where big data could provide more accurate
information.46
C. Predictive Algorithms as Formal Factors
The increasing pervasiveness of predictive algorithms in
policing means that police officers will soon be using these
predictions as part of their arguments justifying reasonable suspicion
or probable cause. Moreover, as police officers use these factors
42. See Ferguson, supra note 12, at 368-69.
43. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000).
44. See, e.g., State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 205 (Minn. 2005).
45. A recent comprehensive report from the RAND Corporation surveyed
every known use of predictive algorithms in law enforcement and showed no
evidence of such algorithms being used to determine reasonable suspicion or
probable cause. See WALTER L. PERRY ET AL., RAND CORP., PREDICTIVE POLICING:
THE ROLE OF CRIME FORECASTING IN LAw ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 107-08
(2013).
46. For example, in the Wardlow case, the Court merely accepted the
testimony of the officer that the stop occurred in an "area known for heavy narcotics
trafficking." 528 U.S. at 119-23. In fact, the actual crime data from the Chicago
district where the stop occurred showed that the district ranked just at the median for
criminal activity of the twenty-five districts in the city. See Amici Curiae Brief of
the National Ass'n of Police Organizations et al. in Support of Petitioner at 7,
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (No. 98-1036), 1999 WL 451226, at *7. For an excellent
discussion of how crime mapping has been used (or ignored) by the Supreme Court,
see Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Crime Mapping and the Fourth Amendment:
Redrawing "High-Crime Areas ", 63 HASTINGS L.J. 179 (2011).
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more often, judges will begin to expect this kind of hard data and
may begin to reject the current subjective, experiential, or anecdotal
evidence that officers currently rely upon.47 This will almost certainly
result in more accurate determinations overall. To see why, we need
to take a closer look at the current system that is used to determine
reasonable suspicion or probable cause.
For example, consider the "high-crime area" determination that
is frequently cited by police officers as a factor supporting
reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The opinion of a police
officer about how much crime occurs in a certain area is likely to be
based on a small sample of cases; it may be based on an outdated
reputation of a neighborhood; and it is possibly tainted by many
different kinds of bias.48 Even if accurate, it is inappropriately
comparative. If the neighborhood in question has three times the
number of drug arrests per week than all of the surrounding
neighborhoods, that fact in itself is irrelevant to a reasonable
suspicion argument.4 9 Instead, the police officer and the judge should
consider the absolute number of criminal activity-does the
neighborhood in question have two drug arrests per week, or ten
drug arrests per week, or fifty drug arrests per week?"
Take another example: An officer is only allowed to frisk a
suspect during a Terry stop if the officer has a reason to believe the
suspect is armed. Up until now, that "reason to believe"-like the
reasonable suspicion underlying the stop itself-has been based on
the opinion and past experience of the police officer and evaluated
based on the intuition of the reviewing court. Police officers
47. Ferguson, supra note 46, at 221-22 ("If the officer did not base his
decision on specific data about a specific crime problem in a specific area, or if the
data relied upon did not demonstrate a specific and relevant crime problem, then
reliance on this information should not be considered.").
48. Id. at 224-25. Professor Ferguson otes that using actual data about
high-crime areas will probably be an improvement: "While not perfect, a more data-
driven approach is an improvement over the police 'war stories' that have essentially
served as the basis of prior designations of high-crime areas. In fact, analysis of
crime data has shown that subjective opinions about high-crime areas are often
erroneous." For a discussion of the possible inherent biases in the data, see infra
Subsection II.A.2.
49. Ferguson, supra note 46, at 223.
50. In fact, the best numbers to consider would not be based on arrest, but
rather on actual criminal activity. Using arrest numbers as a proxy for criminal
activity may lead to a number of inaccuracies, which I discuss in Section III.B, infra.
For a good discussion on the difficulty of determining whether a neighborhood is a
"high-crime area" in the absence of any evidence from big data, see United States v.
Wright, 485 F.3d 45, 49-50 (1st Cir. 2007).
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routinely testify, for example, that individuals suspected of engaging
in narcotics transactions are more likely to have weapons on their
person. In practice, judges have credited this testimony, regularly
approving Terry frisks when the police officer had reasonable
grounds to believe a suspect was engaged in narcotics trafficking."
But what is the actual link between selling narcotics and weapons
possession? If the former actually does make the latter more likely,
what is the degree of increase in probability? Is it the same for every
city, and every neighborhood of every city, and every type of
narcotic? Clinical judgments can answer none of these questions-
nor can they answer these questions for any other factor relied upon
by police when justifying a Terry frisk. Thus, the "reason to believe"
standard has become a legal term of art, defined not by actual
probability but by years of precedents in which certain fact patterns
have been approved by courts based solely on the experience and
expertise of police officers.
In fact, the Bureau of Justice review of over 200,000 criminals
who were convicted in state court shows that only 8.6% of those who
were convicted of drug dealing carried a firearm at the time of the
offense, and only 7.8% of those convicted of drug possession carried
a firearm at the time of the offense.5 2 Does an 8.6% chance give
officers a "reason to believe?" Judges have never answered this
question, preferring instead to rely on the self-reported intuition and
experience of the very police officers who are trying to justify their
own actions.
Other used factors for clinical judgments also may comport
with the intuition of police officers (and with the intuition of the
judges who review the police officers' actions), but may be
empirically false. For example, flight from police has long been held
to be a significant factor in determining reasonable suspicion,5 3 but
studies have shown that in "high-crime urban communities where the
51. See, e.g., Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 122 ("[Officer Nolan] immediately
conducted a protective patdown search for weapons because in his experience it was
common for there to be weapons in the near vicinity of narcotics transactions.").
52. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOw, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FIREARM
USE BY OFFENDERS 3 (2001). The report also found that 2.9% of those who
committed sexual assault carried a firearm, while 4% of those who committed
burglary carried a firearm. Id Of course, the Terry standard asks courts to consider
the likelihood that the suspect has a weapon, not merely a firearm, but this only
emphasizes the need to apply more accurate statistics to the analysis.
53. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125; United States v. Dykes, 406 F.3d 717, 720
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (suspect was stopped in an area "known for the sales of cocaine and
marijuana" and he fled upon seeing the officers exit their cars).
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population is disproportionately minority," there is a very weak link
between flight from police and criminal activity. 54
Courts have long been criticized for deferring to the various
factors police officers use in determining that they have the authority
to make a Terry stop. In his dissent in United States v. Sokolow,
Justice Thurgood Marshall listed dozens of cases in which different
circuit courts had approved of contradictory factors offered to show
that a suspect fit a "drug courier profile" at an airport: first to
deplane; last to deplane, deplaned in the middle, one way ticket,
round-trip ticket, nonstop flight, changed planes, gym bag, new
suitcase, traveled alone, traveled with companion, acted nervously,
acted too calmly.5 As one pair of commentators noted, "Apparently
almost any human trait can be a basis for suspicion, and nearly
everybody exhibits several potentially suspicious . . . factors at any
given time."5 6
In the recent case of Floyd v. City of New York,"5 a class action
suit challenging the stop-and-frisk policies of the New York Police
Department, the trial judge criticized the often used police factors
such as "furtive movements," "high crime area," and "suspicious
bulge" as overly vague.58 During testimony in the case, two police
54. Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent
Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733, 792 (2000).
55. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Illegal immigration profiles came under a similar attack in a dissent in
United States v. Zapata-Ibarra, 223 F.3d 281, 281-82 (5th Cir. 2000) (Wiener, J.,
dissenting).
56. Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling
andDrug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651, 740 (2002); see also
Charles L. Becton, The Drug Courier Profile: "All Seems Infected That Th'Infected
Spy, As All Looks Yellow to the Jaundic'd Eye", 65 N.C. L. REV. 417 (1987); United
States v. Broomfield, 417 F.3d 654, 655 (7th Cir. 2005) ("Whether you stand still or
move, drive above, below, or at the speed limit, you will be described by the police
as acting suspiciously should they wish to stop or arrest you. Such subjective,
promiscuous appeals to an ineffable intuition should not be credited."); Utah v.
Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2069 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("[An officer's]
justification must provide specific reasons why the officer suspected you were
breaking the law, but it may factor in your ethnicity, where you live, what you were
wearing, and how you behaved. The officer does not even need to know which law
you might have broken so long as he can later point to any possible infraction-even
one that is minor, unrelated, or ambiguous." (citations omitted)).
57. 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
58. Id. at 559-60. In the data from New York City reviewed by the court,
"furtive movements" was cited as a factor 42% of the time; "high crime area" 55%
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officers testified as to what they understood "furtive movements" to
mean:
One [officer] explained that "furtive movement is a very broad concept,"
and could include a person "changing direction," "walking in a certain
way," "[a]cting a little suspicious," "making a movement that is not
regular," being "very fidgety," "going in and out of his pocket," "going in
and out of a location," "looking back and forth constantly," "looking over
their shoulder," "adjusting their hip or their belt," "moving in and out of a
car too quickly," "[turning a part of their body away from you,"
"[g]rabbing at a certain pocket or something at their waist," "getting a
little nervous, maybe shaking," and "stutterfing]." Another officer
explained that "usually" a furtive movement is someone "hanging out in
front of [a] building, sitting on the benches or something like that" and
then making a "quick movement," such as "bending down and quickly
standing back up," ".going inside the lobby . . . and then quickly coming
back out," or "all of a sudden becom[ing] very nervous, very aware."
In the statistics from the Floyd case, police officers cited "furtive
movements" as a factor in 42% of their stops.60
Not only are many of the clinical judgment factors overly
vague, their supposed link to criminal activity is based on a very
limited data set. Factors offered by law enforcement officers are
frequently supported only by the officer's own prior experience, and
in approving (or disapproving)61 of these factors as probative of
criminal activity, courts either cite the expertise of the officers or use
their own intuition to evaluate the probability that a crime will occur.
Unsurprisingly, the result of these vague standards and limited
data sets is a troublingly low hit rate for police officers conducting
stop and frisks. The recent expansion of Terry stops in New York
of the time, and "suspicious bulge" 10% of the time. Id. at 559. Sometimes the only
factors cited by the officer were two of these three factors. Id
59. Id at 561. The officers in New York are hardly unique in their use of
vague factors. In Philadelphia, police were engaging in overly aggressive Terry
stops using factors such as "loitering" or "acting suspiciously"; after the police were
sued over their tactics, they agreed in a consent decree to stop using these factors.
See Plaintiffs' Fifth Report to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices at 2-4,
Bailey v. City of Philadelphia (E.D. Pa. 2013) (No. 10-5952).
60. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 559.
61. In the Sokolow case itself, the Ninth Circuit held that there was no
reasonable suspicion because the factors used by the agents were "vague and
inchoate," "hazy in form, susceptible to great adaptations, and almost entirely
speculative," and that "[t]he obvious lack of substantiation [of the government's
conclusion] betrays its lack of merit." United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413,
1423-24 (9th Cir. 1987). But seven Supreme Court Justices looked at the same
factors and concluded that probable cause did exist. United States v. Sokolow, 490
U.S. 1, 9 (1989).
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City resulted in a regime in which only 12% of all Terry stops in
New York City resulted in an arrest or a summons.6 2 During that
same period, only 1.5% of the Teny frisks produced evidence of a
weapon.63 Thus, for that time period, the police officers' standard for
reasonable suspicion was in fact a 12% likelihood that criminal
activity was occurring, while their standard for a "reason to believe"
that a suspect was armed (thus justifying a frisk) was 1.5%. Although
courts have been unwilling to explicitly quantify the percentage
chance for "reasonable suspicion," it is probably more than 12% and
certainly more than 1. 5%.64
Indeed, the district court in the Floyd case concluded that many
of the stops by the police officers during this time period were not
supported by reasonable suspicion.6 5 This implies that the 12%
success rate over that time period was insufficient to support
reasonable suspicion, since it was the result of overly aggressive
police tactics and the use of improper factors. Similarly, a review of
police tactics in Philadelphia concluded that only 3% of the stops
resulted in recovery of contraband; the review also concluded that
reasonable suspicion was lacking for somewhere between 35% and
50% of these stops.66
Thus, there is a growing dissonance between the objective,
data-driven tools used by police officers to guide their conduct, and
the intuitive arguments and subjective experience used by police
officers to justify that conduct in court. Given the success of the
data-driven tools in everyday police work, it seems inevitable that
they will soon be formally used by police officers in assessing
whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause exists.
Although these predictive algorithms have not yet been used in
the context of reasonable suspicion or probable cause, they are not
62. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 558.
63. Id.
64. See infra notes 241-250 and accompanying text for some estimates of
where courts might set this number if predictive algorithms force them to do so.
65. For example, in 36% of the cases the police did not identify any
suspected crimes and approximately half the forms used "Furtive Movements" and
"High Crime Area" as factors, which the judge determined were "vague and
subjective terms" that cannot on their own "reliably demonstrate individualized
reasonable suspicion." Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 559-60.
66. See Plaintiffs' Fifth Report, supra note 59, at 3-4. The police conceded
that the rate of stops without documented reasonable suspicion was around 35%, but
argued that this high number was due to "incomplete paperwork, improper
narratives used by police officers, and an overall lack of credibility in the electronic
data base." Id. at 4.
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completely foreign to the criminal justice system. As we will see in
the next Section, courts have been using these predictive algorithms
in other contexts, such as bail hearings and parole hearings.
D. Predictive Algorithms Elsewhere in the Criminal Justice System
The final step in the use of predictive algorithms is for the
police officers and judges to make their decisions based solely on the
outputs of the algorithms without exercising any of their own
independent judgment. We may never get to this stage for reasonable
suspicion and probable cause determinations (and we may not want
to, as discussed below),6 7 but we have come close to such a world in
other contexts, such as bail determinations, sentencing decisions, and
parole judgments. For decades, judges used generalizations based on
risk factors in making these decisions, but in recent years, just as in
the policing context, big data has slowly been infiltrating these
procedures, using vast quantities of data to empirically test
traditional factors and experiment with new factors.6 8
One example of this shift in the bail context is the Public Safety
Assessment (PSA) designed by the Arnold Foundation, which has
been adopted by about two dozen jurisdictions over the past few
years.6 9 The PSA, which is based on an analysis of one and a half
million criminal cases, uses up to ten different objective factors to
determine whether a defendant is a flight risk or likely to commit a
crime during pretrial release." The results of the PSA have been
nearly uniformly positive-after pilot projects, the city of Charlotte
lowered its pretrial detention by 20%, with no increase in crime or
67. See infra notes 265-282 and accompanying text.
68. In particular, the empirical scholarship on this issue has grown to focus
on big data techniques such as machine learning or massive statistical analyses. See,
e.g., Richard A. Berk, Susan B. Sorenson & Geoffrey Barnes, Forecasting Domestic
Violence: A Machine Learning Approach to Help Inform Arraignment Decisions, 13
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 94 (2016); Richard Berk & Jordan Hyatt, Machine
Learning Forecasts of Risk to Inform Sentencing Decisions, 27 FED. SENT'G REP.
222 (2015); Richard A. Berk & Justin Bleich, Statistical Procedures for Forecasting
Criminal Behavior: A Comparative Assessment, 12 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 513
(2013).
69. Shaila Dewan, Judges Replacing Conjecture with Formula for Bail,
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bench warrants, while the state of Kentucky has saved significant
money and increased accuracy of its pretrial decisions."
The sentencing process i also undergoing a quiet revolution in
the methods that judges use to assess risk of reoffending. Some states
now use formal "risk assessment instruments" to determine the
appropriate sentence after conviction.7 2 These risk assessment
instruments are designed using an algorithm that takes into account
decades of prior cases.7 3 They typically use around ten different
inputs, such as age and history of alcohol abuse, and then assign
defendants a number on a scale, which translates to a percentage
chance that the defendant will reoffend within a certain period of
time.74 For example, Virginia developed a nine-factor risk assessment
instrument based on past evidence and uses the instrument to help
determine whether to divert a defendant away from a prison
sentence." As of now, judges use these risk assessment instruments
as tools to help them make their decision, and judges still maintain
the discretion to depart from the recommendations made by the
instrument,7 6 but the influence of these instruments on the actual
sentencing decision is growing.
Predictive algorithms have also gained popularity in assessing
the appropriateness of parole. Mechanical predictions were used as
far back as the 1920s, long before computers and large databases
became available." The goal of these early predictions was to assess
an inmate's risk of recidivism. Due to the vast number of individuals
who were paroled, even in the early years there was a large pool of
subjects for a natural experiment. Sociologists and psychologists
utilized this pool to examine the characteristics of those who did and
did not succeed on parole." By 2004, over 70% of states that
maintained an active parole system employed some form of
mechanical predictive instrument in determining whether parole was
71. Id.
72. Christopher Slobogin, Risk Assessment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 196, 203-05 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds.,
2012).
73. Id. at 200.
74. Id. at 204.
75. Id. The risk assessment tool looks at type of offense, gender, age,
employment status, and four aspects of the defendant's criminal record. Id
76. Id. For example, in Virginia, 59% of defendants who were considered to
be a low risk by the algorithm were still sentenced to a prison term by the judge. Id
77. See HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 48-51.
78. Id. at 48.
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appropriate." One common tool, the Level of Services Inventory-
Revised (LSI-R), takes into account fifty-four separate factors
ranging from criminal history and education level to alcohol abuse
and attitude towards sentencing." Courts, correctional facilities, and
parole boards routinely use these instruments in determining what
level of supervision an inmate needs in prison, whether he should be
paroled, and what conditions are necessary if parole is granted."
Like police officers, judges who make clinical judgments about
bail, sentencing, or parole may subconsciously or explicitly use
stereotypes or intuitions that are incorrect.8 2 In creating the PSA, the
Arnold Foundation determined that many traditional factors used in
bail hearings, such as defendant's employment status, community
ties, or drug and alcohol abuse, were poor predictors of flight risk.8 3
They also concluded that a face-to-face interview-traditionally a
staple of prearraignment assessment-was not a useful tool.84 In the
sentencing context, many judges had long believed that mental
illness was a strong indicator of recidivism; actual studies of
mentally ill criminals have shown that not to be the case."
There are two obvious differences between the predictive
algorithms used by police during their investigations and those used
by courts in making decisions about bail, sentencing, or parole. The
first seems significant but in fact is relatively trivial: The police
officers are making predictions about past or current behavior (i.e.,
whether the person they are about to stop is currently engaged in
criminal activity or whether the house they would like to search
currently contains drugs), while courts are making predictions about
future behavior (i.e., whether the defendant will return to court if
released or whether the defendant will commit more crimes if
released on parole). In truth, however, there is no material difference
between these two types of predictions-both involve a decision-
maker in the criminal justice system trying to use known facts to
79. Id. at 78.
80. Id. at 80-81.
81. Id. at 82.
82. Id. at 20-21.
83. Id.; see Dewan, supra note 69.
84. HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 82; see Dewan, supra note 69.
85. Henry J. Steadman, Implications from the Baxstrom Experience, 1 J.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 189, 190, 193 (1973). Studies of nearly 1,000 inmates at
a mental hospital for the criminally insane showed that over 97% of the inmate-
patients did not return after being released; even among those with the highest risk
factors (violent criminal history, juvenile record, numerous prior conviction), less
than 10% returned. Id.
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determine the odds that an unknown fact is true. As noted by
Professor Barbara Underwood in one of the first articles regarding
prediction and the law, "Some past or present facts are as elusive as
any prediction, and some predictions can be made with as much
confidence as most determinations of past fact." 6
The second, more significant distinction is in the amount of
time available to conduct the prediction. Police officers deciding
whether to stop or arrest an individual on the street are reacting to an
ongoing and sometimes rapidly changing situation, and therefore
may not have the time to do anything but rely on their clinical
judgments. Even if an accurate, fast-processing algorithm is
available to the police, they may not have time to make the necessary
observations that are required for the algorithm to deliver an accurate
prediction. Judges who are reviewing these judgments at a later
suppression hearing, as well as judges who are making decisions
about search warrants, bail, sentencing, or parole, have the time to
gather more data about the defendant and his circumstances, and then
make use of a predictive algorithm in making their decision. In other
words, predictive software may be less accurate when used by law
enforcement officers than when used by judges.
Nevertheless, the success of these mechanical predictions in the
context of bail and parole hearings shows that courts may be
receptive to applying these tools on the front end of the criminal
justice system-to justify stops, arrests, and searches. Data-driven
predictive algorithms represent an opportunity to dramatically
increase the accuracy of these decisions, thus ensuring that fewer
innocent citizens are detained or searched, and increasing the
efficiency of our law enforcement resources." However, a number of
obstacles remain-both in the design of the algorithms and in the
legal standards used by courts. We will discuss these obstacles in the
next Part.
86. Barbara D. Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior
with Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1413
(1979). Professor Underwood gives an example that "past states of mind are
notoriously difficult to determine, and it is relatively easy to determine the amount
of interest that will be paid by a bank on a deposit." Id at 1413 n.10.
87. Bennett Capers, Policing, Technology, and Doctrinal Assists, FLA. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 33-38), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.




II. CHALLENGES TO USING PREDICTIVE ALGORITHMS
As noted in Part I, crime prediction software could soon be
used by police officers on the street and by judges in criminal courts
to prove reasonable suspicion or probable cause. This development
could potentially result in more accurate and consistent
determinations of whether these standards have indeed been met-
but only if certain obstacles can be overcome. First, there is a
concern that predictive algorithms would use factors that are illegal
for courts to consider, such as the race of the subject." Similarly, the
underlying data that the algorithms use may be in itself biased; thus,
using these algorithms would not actually increase accuracy but
merely reinforce decades of discriminatory policing. Also, the law
requires police officers and judges to act on facts that are specific to
the case at hand; the general probability factors used by big data may
not be able to provide this specificity. And finally, the hyper-
quantified world of big data is currently an uncomfortable fit with
the flexible standards used by courts.
All of these obstacles are surmountable, but only if the
algorithms and databases used by the big data analyses are made
more transparent so that courts can evaluate the underlying processes
and the standards being used, and only if courts are willing to accept
the quantified world of predictive software.
A. Detecting the Racial Biases in the Predictive Algorithms
To the extent that human beings have a hand in creating the
algorithms and compiling the data that the algorithms use, human
biases will infect the results. Although it is impossible to eliminate
these biases altogether, there are ways to minimize the problems they
create.
88. Some scholars argue that many of the risk prediction factors currently in
use in sentencing decisions may be unconstitutional because they rely directly or
indirectly on race or other suspect classes. See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based
Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV.
803, 819 (2014). But see Christopher Slobogin, Risk Assessment and Risk
Management in Juvenile Justice, 27 CRIM. JUST. 10, 13-15 (2013) (use of gender and
age in sentencing decisions i permissible because it survives intermediate scrutiny);
J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and Evidence-
Based Sentencing, 64 SMU L. REV. 1329, 1385-88 (2001) (sentencing factors
survive a strict scrutiny analysis).
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1. Direct and Indirect Use ofForbidden Factors
Mechanical predictions are not necessarily color-blind. If an
individual's race is a significant factor in determining whether a
certain outcome is likely to occur, then the individuals who are
designing (and using) the algorithm may be tempted to use race as
one of the inputs in order to achieve more accurate results. In some
cases outside the context of criminal procedure, this may be
relatively harmless-for example, when companies use big data to
decide where to market certain products or when political campaigns
use big data to decide which voters to contact with a certain kind of
outreach. In other cases, race-based factors can be quite harmful (and
illegal)-for example, in deciding which customers are a good credit
risk for a home loan'9 or which job applicants should be hired.9o In
the context of criminal procedure, race-based factors are especially
problematic, both legally and morally.
For the purposes of this discussion, let's assume that a private
company has developed an algorithm that can predict with great
accuracy whether drugs will be found inside a certain house. The
algorithm requires the user to enter six different inputs, such as the
neighborhood where the house is located, the prior criminal
convictions of the house's owner, and observations made by police
officers about activity outside the house. One of these inputs is the
race of the owner of the home. Assume, further, that without using
the race factor, the algorithm can predict the presence of drugs with
40% accuracy, but with the race factor, the algorithm can predict the
presence of drugs with 55% accuracy. Assume the police have
purchased this algorithm and are using it in their warrant application.
Should they input the race factor in order to enhance the algorithm's
accuracy? In other words, would it be illegal for the state to use race
as a factor in determining probable cause or reasonable suspicion if it
could be definitively proven that using race made the prediction
more accurate?
89. See, e.g., Sarah Ludwig, Credit Scores in America Perpetuate Racial
Injustice. Here's How, GUARDIAN (Oct. 13, 2015, 10:14 AM), https://www.
theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/I 3 your-credit-score-is-racist-heres-why
[https://perma.cc/4P6B-WM55]; 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2012).
90. See Lee Price, Racial Discrimination Continues to Play a Part in Hiring
Decisions, ECON. POL'Y INST. (Sept. 17, 2003), http://www.epi.org/publication/




Surprisingly, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has little to say
about whether race can be used as a factor in determining reasonable
suspicion or probable cause. Courts are unanimous in holding that
race alone can never be the basis for a stop or a search, for the
obvious reason that a person's race alone can never create probable
cause or even reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is
occurring.9' However, some courts have approved cases in which
race was one of many factors in deciding whether reasonable
suspicion or probable cause existed-for example, when searching
for illegal immigrants near the Mexican border.92 Other courts have
disagreed, arguing that a person's race is "of such little probative
value [in the reasonable suspicion analysis] that it may not be
considered as a relevant factor."9 3
As these cases make clear, the only problem with using race
under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is that in the vast majority
of cases, the race of a subject is not a relevant indicator as to whether
the suspect is more or less likely to engage in criminal activity.94
Therefore, any law enforcement official who does consider race is
almost certainly doing so because of an irrational bias against that
particular race. But this objection is not entirely valid in every
circumstance-as noted above, if the law enforcement officer is
looking for illegal immigrants near the Mexican border, for example,
the suspect's race could conceivably be one factor in trying to predict
whether the suspect was illegally in the country. Likewise, if a
person seems "out of place" due to her race (for example, a white
person in a predominantly black neighborhood), her race could be
one factor that would lead to reasonable suspicion that she was
engaging in criminal activity.'
91. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-87 (1975)
("[Mexican ancestry] alone ... does not justify stopping all Mexican-Americans to
ask if they are aliens.").
92. Id. ("The likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an
alien is high enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor. ); see also
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562-63 (1976).
93. United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir.
2000).
94. See, e.g., State v. Kuhn, 517 A.2d 162, 165 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1986) ("No rational inference may be drawn from the race of [a person] that he may
be engaged in criminal activities.").
95. It is harder to come up with an example in the bail context where the
defendant's race was actually a relevant factor in determining flight risk or danger to
the community. Certain factors that are correlated to race (such as income level or
employment status) may be relevant, however.
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Given this jurisprudence, there is no valid Fourth Amendment
objection to using race as a factor in a mechanical prediction
algorithm for reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Assuming we
have a properly designed algorithm,9 6 race would only be used as a
factor if it actually was a useful predictor of individualized
suspicion; in other words, there would be empirical statistical proof
that in the given context race did help determine whether or not an
individual was guilty of a crime. In our hypothetical case, in which
the use of race increased the accuracy of the prediction from 40% to
55%, using the race-based factor would not be prohibited under the
Fourth Amendment.
The Equal Protection Clause is another matter, however. Under
the Equal Protection Clause, race can only be used as a factor in state
actions if the use of race is necessary and if it is narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling state interest." This is a difficult, if not
impossible, burden for law enforcement to meet in the stop-and-
search context. Some courts have held that the use of race as a factor
does not require exclusion as long as there were sufficient other
factors to justify the stop or search,99 while others have noted that
law enforcement officers violate the Equal Protection Clause if they
incorporate race routinely as a factor in their drug courier profile."
Neither of these principles bodes well for using race as a factor in
mechanical prediction algorithms, regardless of how accurate it
might be. As further evidence that racial factors are forbidden by the
Equal Protection Clause, nearly all the civil suits alleging racial
96. As we will see, one of the objections to using mechanical predictions i
that the underlying data may be tainted by preexisting biases in the criminal justice
system that overstate the criminal activity of certain ethnic minorities. See infra
Subsection II.A.2.
97. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) ("[T]he
constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws
is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment."). But see Gross &
Barnes, supra note 56, at 733-38 (surveying lower court decisions and concluding
that "American judges are ambivalent and divided about the use of race as a basis
for individualized suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. Lower court cases go
both ways, but increasingly the tone is negative").
98. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995).
99. See, e.g., Lowery v. Commonwealth, 388 S.E.2d 265, 267 (Va. Ct. App.
1990).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 956 F.2d 572, 578-79 (6th Cir. 1992)
(en banc); see also Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 333 (1998) (discussing the legality of racial profiling).
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profiling result in consent decrees that forbid the use of race as a
factor.'o
Outside the Fourth Amendment context, the seminal case on
racial bias in the criminal justice system is McCleskey v. Kemp, in
which a black defendant argued that the state of Georgia engaged in
racial discrimination when administering the death penalty.'02 The
defendant relied on a study that showed that defendants who killed
white victims were far more likely to be sentenced to death than
those who killed black victims.'03 The study also showed that black
defendants were more likely to get the death penalty than white
defendants.04 The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's
arguments, holding that in order to prevail on an equal protection
claim, the defendant had to demonstrate that the decision-makers in
the process acted with a "discriminatory purpose."o' The Justices
were concerned with interfering with the discretion that is given to
prosecutors, judges, and juries, and thus said it required
"exceptionally clear proof before [the Court] would infer that the
discretion has been abused."'06
Based on this jurisprudence, it is hard to see our hypothetical
algorithm passing constitutional muster. Even assuming that the
interdiction of drugs is a compelling state interest, law enforcement
would be hard pressed to argue that using the race-based factor was
necessary and narrowly tailored to accomplish that purpose. The use
of the algorithm would probably be seen as nothing more than a
sophisticated method of racial profiling-an institutionalization of
using race as a factor in determining probable cause.
The only plausible defense for the state would be to argue that
although race is clearly a factor in the decision made by the
algorithm, the decision is not made with a "discriminatory purpose"
as forbidden by McCleskey. In other words, those who design and
use the algorithm are (arguably) not acting with racial animus or out
of any intent to treat the members of one race differently than
another. This narrower definition of "discriminatory purpose" is
consistent with McCleskey's language, which held that
101. See Gross & Barnes, supra note 56, at 743 (citing settlement
agreements with the Maryland State Police and various other Department of Justice
racial profiling consent decrees).
102. 481 U.S. 279, 291-92 (1987).
103. Id. at 293-99 & n.11.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 292-93.
106. Id. at 297.
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"' [d]iscriminatory purpose' . . . implies more than intent as volition
or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the
decisionmaker ... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action
at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse
effects upon an identifiable group."' 7 This does not really fit the
state's motivation in using the algorithm-the police are not
choosing to use the algorithm (or, more specifically, the race factor)
"because of' its adverse effects on a particular race; they are using it
to increase the accuracy of their predictions.
However, the narrow definition of "discriminatory purpose" is
not bome out in other areas of criminal procedure. For example, in
the context of jury selection, the Court held that if a defendant
established a pattern of racial discrimination in peremptory jury
challenges, the prosecutor could only prevail if she could provide a
racially neutral reason for making those challenges." The Court
further noted that "the prosecutor may not rebut the defendant's
prima facie case of discrimination by stating merely that he
challenged jurors of the defendant's race on the assumption-or his
intuitive judgment-that they would be partial to the defendant
because of their shared race."0 9 This would be analogous to a
prosecutor arguing that explicit discrimination should be allowed in
the probable cause algorithm because it increases the accuracy of the
prediction.
Thus, our hypothetical algorithm could not legally use race as a
factor, however much that factor could be proven to increase
accuracy. This legal conclusion is consistent with most individuals'
intuitive moral sense and (relatedly) to the political feasibility of
using predictive algorithms. In the past, the media has harshly
criticized racial profiling,"0 and it is unlikely that the public would
support a system that regularly and explicitly used race as a
significant factor to determine whether to stop a person or search his
home.
But explicit use of race is not the only potential problem in the
context of predictive algorithms, and this is where the need for
107. Id. at 298 (quoting Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279
(1979)).
108. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97-98 (1986).
109. Id. at 97.
110. See, e.g., Conor Friedersdorf, The NYPD Officers Who See Racial Bias





transparency becomes significant. It would be relatively easy for
courts to enforce a rule that prohibits the police from using the
defendant's race directly as a factor in predictive algorithms, but this
may not prevent the algorithm from relying on factors that are
strongly correlated to race. Assume we change our hypothetical
algorithm and remove the race factor altogether, but still use the
location of the house as one of the factors. As has been established
by decades of redlining neighborhoods,"' location can be an
effective proxy for race in the context of providing insurance,
banking services, health care, or many other types of services."2 As
we saw earlier, current software used by police to predict crime
patterns is highly location-specific, and it is certainly possible to
imagine a scenario in which higher-crime areas track the racial
makeup of specific neighborhoods."3 We can call this "indirect
discrimination" as opposed to the unconstitutional direct
discrimination that occurs when race is officially used as a factor."4
Nearly every predictive program that is currently in use has given
rise to concerns about indirect discrimination. 5 Thus, before law
enforcement agents and judges officially use these programs to
formally help them make their decisions, we need to determine
whether it is legally or ethically permissible to use these nonracial
elements that are correlated to race.
One way of answering this question is to note that proxies for
race are already used in determinations of reasonable suspicion or
111. The term "redlining" came from "residential security maps" that were
used by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB") in the 1930s to describe
the quality of real estate investments in different parts of the city. Certain areas,
known as "Type D" neighborhoods, were outlined in red on the map to indicate the
riskiest areas for mortgages. See BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN
BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR DATA AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD 109 (2015).
112. See id.
113. See supra Section I.A.
114. The problem of indirect discrimination is related to a more sinister
problem-that of intentional "masking." Masking occurs when a decision-maker
truly wishes to discriminate, but knows that doing so explicitly is forbidden. The
decision-maker then intentionally chooses factors that are close statistical proxies for
race and then uses them as factors. See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst,
Big Data's Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671, 692-93 (2016). Masking can
occur when a decision-maker uses traditional clinical judgments as well when she
uses mechanical predictions, but could be easier to achieve with big data methods.
Id.
115. See, e.g., Stroud, supra note 33; Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias,
PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-
assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/W6K7-XKME].
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probable cause. Police officers routinely testify that they made their
observations in a "high crime area" as a factor that led to their
reasonable suspicion or probable cause."6 No doubt in many
instances, higher-crime neighborhoods will tend to be inner city
neighborhoods with higher proportions of certain minority groups "7
(or at least this will be the perspective of many police officers and
judges)."
And this formal use of proxies for race under the current
system is likely only the tip of the iceberg. The unconscious (or
conscious) racial biases of police officers and magistrates permeate
every aspect of the front end of the criminal justice system. '9 Under
the current system, police officers disproportionately stop and frisk
black and Latino suspects, and they are more likely to engage in
violent and even lethal conduct when interacting with these
116. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000).
117. See ELIZABETH KNEEBONE & STEVEN RAPHAEL, METRO. POLICY
PROGRAM AT BROOKINGS, CITY AND SUBURBAN CRIME TRENDS IN METROPOLITAN
AMERICA 2-3 (May 2011), https://gspp.berkeley.edu/assets/uploads/research/pdfp66.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EW7Z-UDMT].
118. Proxies for race are also used at other stages of the criminal justice
system. At bail hearings, for example, magistrates will routinely consider the prior
criminal history of the defendant in deciding whether the defendant is a flight risk or
a danger to others. See DAVID N. ADAIR, JR., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE BAIL REFORM
ACT OF 1984, at 6 (3d ed. 2006), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/bailact3.
pdf/$file/bailact3.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3TL-79JA]. Criminal history is linked to
race because certain ethnic groups have higher rates of conviction than others. See
George Gao, Chart of the Week: The Black-White Gap in Incarceration Rates, PEW
RES. CTR. (July 18, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/07/18/chart-of-
the-week-the-black-white-gap-in-incarceration-rates/ [https://perma.cc/E45N-L6XQ].
Other factors that magistrates use, such as employment or home ownership, are
strongly correlated to poverty, which is correlated to race. ADAIR, supra, at 6.
119. Of course, these biases permeate the rest of the criminal justice system
as well, as evidenced by the statistics cited in MeCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 227,
293-99 (1987), and other studies showing biases in prosecutorial charging decisions,
jury verdicts, and sentencing. See, e.g., Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The
Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 805-22 (2012) (bias in charging decisions); Robert Barnes,
Supreme Court to Hear Case ofAlleged Racial Bias by Juror, WASH. POST (Apr. 4,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts law/supreme-court-to-hear-case-
of-alleged-racial-bias-by-juror/2016/04/04/c9256e9c-fa92-1 1e5-9140-e61d062438bb
story.html [https://perma.cc/9Q2M-CW3T] (bias by jurors); Edward Helmore, Racial
Bias Evident in South Carolina Criminal Sentences, Study Reveals, GUARDIAN (Feb.
29, 2016, 12:01 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/feb/29/racial-bias-
criminal-sentencing-south-carolina [https://perma.cc/2UFC-BLC2] (bias in sentencing).




suspects.'2 0 The findings from the class action lawsuit challenging the
expanded police stop and frisks in New York City'2 ' found that over
an eight-and-a-half-year period, 52% of all the citizens subjected to
Terry stops were black, even though black citizens made up only
23% of the population.12 2 Studies have shown similar numbers in
Philadelphia,12 3 Los Angeles,124 Boston,125 and on the New Jersey
turnpike.126 Unlike the formal factors which can (at least in theory) be
proven to be proxies for race, the use and effect of these informal
decisions are difficult to detect and even more difficult to prove in
court. These implicit biases on the part of police officers are also
difficult to cure, even in the long run, since they exist in almost every
individual, even those who harbor no conscious prejudices.12 7
In other words, the current system relies on personal, subjective
clinical judgments that are based on some known factors (which are
120. John Cassidy, The Statistical Debate Behind the Stop-and-Frisk Verdict,
NEW YORKER (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/the-
statistical-debate-behind-the-stop-and-frisk-verdict [h tps://perma.cc/FT7P-QZTZ].
121. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556, 573-75 (2013).
122. Id. at 574. This disproportionality cannot be explained by a higher rate
of criminal activity by black citizens, since the "hit rate" for stopping black citizens
was actually lower than that for white citizens-1.0% of the frisks of black citizens
resulted in a weapon and 1.8% resulted in contraband, while 1.4% of the frisks of
whites resulted in a weapon and 2.3% resulted in contraband. Id
123. See Plaintiffs' Third Report to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk
Practices, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia (E.D. Pa. 2013) (No. 10-5952).
124. See IAN AYRES & JONATHAN BOROWSKY, A STUDY OF RACIALLY
DISPARATE OUTCOMES IN THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT (Oct. 2008),
https://www.aclusocal.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/11837125-LAPD-Racial-
Profiling-Report-ACLU.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9YV-9H2Y]. The report shows that
black residents are three times as likely to be the subject of a Terry stop as white
residents, but that black residents are less likely to receive a citation after the stop,
demonstrating that "African Americans are more often subject to stops without
justification where no ticket could be issued." ACLU OF S. CAL., RACIAL PROFILING
AND THE LAPD: A SUMMARY OF PROFESSOR IAN AYERS' REPORT ON RACIALLY
DISPARATE OUTCOMES IN THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, https://www.
aclusocal.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/99227648-Racial-Profiling-the-LAPD.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FHV5-4EQP].
125. See ACLU FOUND. OF MASS., BLACK, BROWN AND TARGETED: A
REPORT ON BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT STREET ENCOUNTERS FROM 2007-2010
(Oct. 2014), http://www.bostonherald.com/sites/default/files/media/2014/10/08/black
brown and targeted online.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VHB-Z5RH].
126. See John Lamberth, Driving While Black: A Statistician Proves That
Prejudice Still Rules the Road, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING: NEW AND
ESSENTIAL READINGS 32,33 (Stephen K. Rice & Michael D. White eds., 2010).
127. See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses ofRace, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489,
1491-528 (2005).
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explicitly described by the police officer or magistrate when
requesting a warrant or justifying their decision) and some unknown
factors (such as unconscious biases). Even for the explicitly listed
known factors, the decision-makers do not (and likely could not)
quantify the degree to which they relied on each individual factor.
For example, assume a police officer is driving through a
neighborhood and notices a young black man standing on the street
corner. The young man is dressed in a way that is common to the
neighborhood but that the police officer identifies as consistent with
gang affiliation. The man then looks over at the officer, immediately
places something in his pocket, and then walks briskly away from
the officer. Assume at this point the officer honestly believes that
there is a reasonable suspicion that the man is engaging in criminal
activity (that is, the officer is not out to hassle the young man and is
not simply stopping people indiscriminately in the hope of finding
contraband). The officer then gets out of her car and orders the man
to stop.
Later on, the officer is required to justify her stop by explaining
why she believed she had reasonable suspicion to believe criminal
activity was afoot. She lists the following factors:
(1) The action took place in a high crime neighborhood;
(2) The suspect hid an item after noticing a police officer;
(3) The suspect attempted to leave the scene after noticing a police officer.
The police officer does not list (and may not even be
consciously aware of) other factors that led her to believe the suspect
may have been engaged in criminal activity:
(1) The suspect's race (the officer subconsciously believes that black men
are more likely to possess guns or drugs than white men);
(2) The suspect's age (the officer believes that men in their twenties are
more likely to be engaged in criminal activity than children or men over
forty);
(3) The suspect's gender (the officer believes that men are more likely to
be carrying drugs or weapons than women);
(4) The suspect's clothing (which is actually common to the neighborhood
but which the police officer subconsciously associates with criminals);
(5) The way the suspect looked at the police officer, which the officer
couldn't describe in testimony but which she associated with hostility to
authority and to police specifically.
Racial bias played a role in the officer's determination that the
defendant was likely engaged in criminal activity, but it is impossible
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to know to what degree. Of the formal elements, the fact that the
encounter took place in a "high crime neighborhood" is likely
correlated to race, but neither the officer nor the magistrate
reviewing her conduct are able to explain exactly how important that
factor was out of the three that were listed. And the fact that the
suspect's race led the officer to focus on this particular individual (as
opposed to the young white man she observed standing on a different
street comer two minutes before this interaction) may have played a
significant role in her decision or a very minor role. Likewise, the
suspect's clothing (likely another proxy for race) may have been a
strong motivator for her to act, or it may have been relatively
insignificant. There is simply no way to measure, much less prove,
the degree to which race or proxies for race influenced her decision
to detain the suspect. Over the course of many years and tens of
thousands of stops, a clear pattern will probably emerge that shows
that this police department disproportionately stops people of color,
but effective remedies at that point are hard to come by.
It is against this backdrop that we must evaluate any potential
future use of predictive software. In contrast to the use of clinical
judgments, predictive software will only base its results on the
formal factors that are coded into its system. Thus, there will be no
unconscious or hidden human biases that affect its decision.
Furthermore, we can precisely quantify the degree to which each of
the formal factors affects the result, so a judge (or a policymaker)
can make an informed judgment as to whether certain factors that are
proxies for race are dominating the calculation. In other words, under
the current system of clinical judgments, the only way to infer
indirect discrimination is by reviewing the aggregate results after
many months or years have passed. Under a system of mechanical
predictions, the level of indirect discrimination can be assessed even
before a stop or a search occurs by examining the algorithm the
police intend to use. Thus, the mechanical predictive algorithms can
be designed to ignore (or at least minimize) improper factors such as
race-something that may be impossible to do if we leave these
determinations to the subjective determinations of police officers.'2 8
All of this, however, depends on a high level of transparency in
the algorithm itself, so that judges and other policymakers (including
the police department that is considering adoption of the algorithm)
can review the factors, their correlation (if any) to race, and the
strength of any specific factor in reaching the result. We will
128. See infra Section III.A and accompanying text.
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examine the challenges of achieving this level of transparency in Part
III.
2. Preexisting Biases in the Underlying Data
A related concern about using mechanical predictions involves
the underlying data that is used by the predictive algorithms. Put
simply, if the underlying data is discriminatory, then the results that
are based on that data will be discriminatory, and the supposedly
color-blind algorithms will be doing nothing more than reinforcing
the existing racial bias in the criminal justice system. In the civil
context, commentators are beginning to pay close attention to these
potential problems, noting that "[i]f a sample includes a
disproportionate representation of a particular class ... the results of
an analysis of that sample may skew in favor of or against the over-
or underrepresented class."2 9
As an example, assume that for the past twenty years a
metropolitan police department has been disproportionately stopping,
searching, and arresting black and Latino citizens. This
disproportionate treatment does not stem from the fact that citizens
from these groups are more likely to commit crimes, but from
inherent racial biases in the criminal justice system, such as the
tendency of police to engage with minorities more than with whites
and the increased level of policing in minority neighborhoods.'3 0
Assume also that these stops, searches, and arrests result in
conviction at a higher rate than stops, searches, and arrests of white
citizens-again, not because the police are better at predicting crime
for the minority citizens, but because of downstream biases in the
criminal justice system: Because black and Latino defendants tend to
be poorer,3 ' they are less likely to be able to afford private lawyers
129. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 114, at 686.
130. This is, of course, not really a hypothetical case. Studies have shown,
for example, that black citizens are nearly four times as likely to be arrested on
charges of marijuana possession as white citizens, even though both blacks and
whites use the drug at similar rates. In some states, black citizens were eight times as
likely to be arrested. Ian Urbina, Blacks Are Singled Out for Marituana Arrests,
Federal Data Suggests, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2013), http://nyti.ms/18KaQO5 [https://
perma.cc/K5XQ-VMJ6]. One of the reasons for this disparity is that "police
departments, partly driven by a desire to increase their drug arrest statistics, can
concentrate on minority or poorer neighborhoods to meet numerical goals." Id.
131. See, e.g., Suzanne Macartney, Alemayehu Bishaw, and Kayla Fontenot,
POVERTY RATES FOR SELECTED DETAILED RACE AND HISPANIC GROUPS BY STATE
AND PLACE: 2007-2011 at 1, American Community Survey Survey Briefs, United
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and less likely to be able to afford bail; and because of conscious or
subconscious prejudice on the part of prosecutors and judges, black
and Latino defendants are more likely to be overcharged'32 (leading
to higher rates of plea bargaining) and more likely to be convicted by
a jury if the case goes to trial.'33
These discriminatory stops, searches, arrests, and convictions
will become the underlying data for the city's predictive algorithms,
and they create two distinct problems for mechanical predictions.
The first is related to the disproportionately high rate of encounters
between the police and members of the minority community-the
so-called "hassle" rate.'34 This will create large amounts of data
about certain individuals or areas of a city and disproportionately
small amounts of data about other individuals or areas. Thus, when
an algorithm determines whether a neighborhood is a "high crime
area," it will have a skewed interpretation of the frequency of crimes
in different areas. This in turn will lead to more frequent searches of
individuals in the "high crime areas," which will create a self-
fulfilling prophecy as more individuals are stopped, searched,
arrested, and thus convicted in those areas. Likewise, if an individual
is determined to be at "high risk" for committing a crime, it could
merely be reflecting the prejudices of police officers who have had
previous encounters with the individual.1" Professor Bernard
Harcourt refers to this as the "ratchet" effect: If certain factors are
already perceived as leading to higher levels of criminal activity, a
States Census Bureau (February 2013) (showing black and Latino poverty rates at
twice those for white Americans), http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/acsbr11-
17.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3YX-VJ6Y].
132. Id. at 10-12; see also RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE,
INCARCERATION'S FRONT DOOR: THE MISUSE OF JAILS IN AMERICA 15 (Feb. 2015),
http://www.safetyandjusticechallenge.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/incarcerations-
front-door-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/GRV7-NFRG].
133. SENTENCING PROJECT, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE
UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: REGARDING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN
THE UNITED STATES CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 10-12 (Aug. 2013), http://
sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Race-and-Justice-Shadow-Report-
ICCPR.pdf [https://perma.cc/NR9M-3ZDJ].
134. See Jane Bambauer, Hassle, 113 MICH. L. REV. 461, 464-65 (2015)
(arguing that the "hassle rate"-the rate at which individuals are stopped by the
police-is at least as important as the "hit rate"-the rate at which these encounters
uncover criminal activity-because a low hassle rate will ensure that the police have
particularized suspicion when they conduct their stops). We will discuss the problem
of particularized suspicion in Subsection III.B.2, infra.
135. See generally Wayne A. Logan & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing
Criminal Justice Data, 101 MINN. L. REV. 541 (2016).
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predictive algorithm will lead police and judges to conduct and
authorize more searches on suspects who meet these factors, leading
to more arrests that are linked to those factors.13 6
The second problem relates to the disproportionately high ratio
of convictions to arrests for minority populations-what is usually
referred to as the "hit" rate.'37 The primary way to know whether a
stop, search, or arrest is successful (is a "hit") is by examining
conviction rates. Thus, even if in fact the police do find contraband
at the same rate for every ethnic group that is searched, if certain
minority groups are convicted at a higher rate after the contraband is
discovered, the statistics will indicate a higher hit rate for those
minority groups than for others. In other words, because these
citizens are unfairly convicted at a higher rate, the stops and searches
that are conducted against them will appear to be more effective.'38
As with the decision-making process itself, this problem is not
new to mechanical predictions. The "data" that are used by police
officers and judges today-their own personal experiences-is
similarly flawed.3 9 The danger in moving towards a big data analysis
in this context is not that a new problem will be created, but that-
despite big data's promise of being color-blind and objective-the
old problems will persist. Even worse, these old problems will
become institutionalized and thus be even harder to successfully
challenge and expose because they are presented as part of the "hard
science" of big data.
These problems with underlying data are not insoluble. The
issue is common to many uses of big data, and it arises when
statistics that are kept for one purpose are used for another.'40 Stop-
and-frisk statistics and criminal conviction numbers are not recorded
for the purposes of sophisticated statistical study; thus, those who
collect them generally make no effort to correct for any biases
inherent in the process.4 ' Part of the solution thus involves
correcting the data-that is, estimating the rate of over-
136. See HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 145-71.
137. Id. at 112.
138. See Stroud, supra note 33 (discussing Chicago's "heat list" and noting
that "[flrom what the CPD is willing to share, most of the collected information for
the heat list is focused on rap sheets-arrest and conviction records. So rather than
collecting information on everyone, they're collecting and using information on
people who have had interactions with the police").
139. See Bambauer, supra note 134, at 473-74.
140. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 114, at 686 ("Data gathered for
routine business purposes tend to lack the rigor of social scientific data collection.").
141. See id. at 674.
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representation of minorities in the hassle rates and hit rates and then
adjusting the numbers accordingly.'42 Another solution would be to
use data from different sources, not just from information that results
from police-citizen encounters. For example, algorithms could draw
their underlying data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics' National
Crime Victimization Survey,'43 which tracks crimes based on victim
reports, as opposed to the more traditional method of tracking crime
through police reports.14
Once again, these solutions require real transparency as to the
data being used. Courts and policymakers need to demand to see the
source of the data used by the predictive algorithms and need to be
given the tools to evaluate whether the data is representative of
reality or the product of discriminatory decisions or unfair processes
from the past.
B. Ensuring the Computer Looks for Individualized Suspicion
Individualized suspicion is a bedrock requirement of almost
any police action that implicates the Fourth Amendment.'45 If police
officers knew that statistically speaking, 60% of everyone living in a
certain building were guilty of possessing drugs, they would not be
allowed to arrest everyone in the building, even though they would
almost certainly have probable cause to believe that each person is
guilty.'46 The Fourth Amendment demands a certain level of
142. Id. at 727.
143. See Data Collection: National Crime Victimization Survey, BUREAU
JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty-dcdetail&iid=245 [https://perma.cc/
2DRN-VM9W] (last visited Nov. 19, 2016).
144. See, e.g., Uniform Crime Reporting, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/cjis/ucr/ucr#cius [https://perma.cc/46T7-XPCE] (last visited Nov. 19, 2016).
145. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979); Maryland v.
Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418
(1981). The only exception involves special needs searches, when police officers are
(at least in theory) acting for a purpose other than crime control and are therefore
permitted to conduct reasonable searches on defined groups of people (such as
airline travelers, drivers, or students) in order to further that purpose. See, e.g., Mich.
Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449-50 (1990).
146. For a detailed discussion of the individualization requirement, see
Bambauer, supra note 134, at 490-94. Bambauer begins with a variation on this
hypothetical, in which the police obtain results of a study that shows that 60% of all
Harvard dorm rooms contain illegal drugs. Id. at 462. This is adopted from a
hypothetical proposed by Professor Orin Kerr. See Orin Kerr, Why Courts Should
Not Quantify Probable Cause, in THE POLITICAL HEART OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
135-37 (Michael Klarman, David Skeel & Carol Steiker eds., 2012).
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particularity; that is, not merely a statistical likelihood that a suspect
is guilty based on his membership in a certain group, but a reference
to particular characteristics or actions by the suspect that shows that
he specifically is likely to be guilty.147
One objection to using mechanical predictions is that they will
dilute or even eliminate the individualization requirement by
focusing on broad categories instead of the individual's
particularized conduct.148 Even if big data's mechanical predictions
could lead to more accurate results, it would be legally and morally
wrong to punish a person based on membership in a specific group
(such as economic class or age) instead of focusing on the person's
individual actions.14 9
In order to address this concern, we first have to define what
we mean when we say that suspicion must be individualized.' In
general, we mean that police officers must look at the specific
characteristics and actions of the suspect himself, and not determine
reasonable suspicion or probable cause merely because the suspect is
a member of a certain group. However, individualized suspicion does
not preclude inferring facts about an individual based on his
147. See Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Search and Seizure in a Post-9/11
World, 80 Miss. L.J. 1507, 1518 (2011) (arguing that "demographic probabilities"
are insufficient to create probable cause or reasonable suspicion; the police must
also notice something "specific to the defendant o create the probability as to him").
148. See, e.g., Underwood, supra note 86, at 1425-29; Michael L. Rich,
Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth Amendment,
164 U. PA. L. REV. 871, 896-901 (2016). In fact, many of the objections to using
statistical information in the criminal investigation process focus only on the
requirement for individualized suspicion. See Erica Goldberg, Getting Beyond
Intuition in the Probable Cause Inquiry, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 789, 806-07
(2013).
149. See, e.g., HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 173-92.
150. See Bambauer, supra note 134, at 469. Professor Bambauer examines
(and rejects) four different conceptions of individualized suspicion: the need for
case-by-case assessment, theneed to engage in human intuition, the need to focus on
conduct under the control of the suspect, and tracing suspicion from a crime to a
suspect instead of from an individual to a crime. Id. at 469-82. She then proposes her
own definition of individualization, which focuses on the "hassle rate"-that is, the
proportion of the innocent population who were searched. Id. at 482-94. Using big
data algorithms to determine reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not
compatible with all of these definitions-for example, it downplays or eliminates the
use of human intuition and will frequently start with an analysis of a suspect rather
than with a crime. But these algorithms will be particularly useful if one adopts
Professor Bambauer's concept of hassle rates, since they focus on specific hit rates




membership in a certain group; it simply requires the presence of
additional factors that are specific to the suspect. Even in the analog
world of clinical judgments, police officers and judges routinely rely
on assumptions about an individual based in part on the
characteristics of their group. For example, police officers will give
some weight to a suspect's known gang affiliation, while magistrates
making bail determinations will consider whether a defendant is
unemployed or has a criminal record.
However, it would be inappropriate to stop, search, or arrest an
individual solely based on his membership in a specific group. 151
This would essentially be saying that the group characteristics of the
individual are so suspicious that at any given moment there is reason
to believe that he is likely to be engaging in criminal activity. In
order to avoid this problem, courts have held that the police officer
must observe conduct that gives her some reason to believe that the
suspect is currently engaging in criminal activity.152 These actions
may be legal (but suspicious) conduct, such as running from the
police, exiting a location where drugs are known to be sold while
sticking something in a pocket, or wearing a heavy coat on a summer
day. Or they may be legal and innocuous conduct, such as
purchasing a one-way ticket or traveling with no luggage. But the
reasonable suspicion or probable cause cannot be based only on who
the person is; it must also be based on what the person does.153
151. That is, it would be inappropriate to do so outside the context of a
special needs search. See supra note 145.
152. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
153. See Ferguson, supra note 12, at 388. Big Data Professor Ferguson
further argues that there needs to be a link between the suspect's suspicious
background information and his current actions: "Courts analyzing big data
suspicion should thus be careful to require a direct link between the past data about a
suspect and the observed suspicion." Id. Otherwise, Professor Ferguson argues that
the background information is irrelevant to the reasonable suspicion analysis. Id It
is not clear how "direct" the link would have to be; however, many different types of
criminal activity may be linked together in an officer's mind (such as prior
convictions of illegal weapons possession combined with a current observation
indicating possible drug dealing). Id The linkage could be even more indirect-and
yet statistically significant-when big data is used. For example, assume that a
statistical analysis of thousands of burglars shows that individuals who have prior
convictions for child abuse are 35% more likely to commit burglary than those
without such a conviction. Even though there is no logical link between the two
crimes, this fact could be considered as one factor (among many others) by an
algorithm determining whether probable cause exists to believe a specific suspect is
guilty of burglary.
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The Supreme Court has repeatedly reminded us of the need to
consider the specific actions of the individual being searched. In
Ybarra v. Illinois, law enforcement officers with a warrant to search
a tavern decided to stop and frisk every individual inside the tavern,
under the theory that mere presence in a tavern where drugs were
being sold generated reasonable suspicion that a person possessed
drugs.'5 4 The Supreme Court rejected this argument, explaining that
"the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than
reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked."'
A mechanical prediction that is used to demonstrate reasonable
suspicion or probable cause must meet these same criteria.5 6 Law
school hypotheticals aside, it is hard to imagine a situation in the real
world where group characteristics alone rise to the level of
reasonable suspicion, but it is theoretically possible that a
mechanical prediction would arrive at such a result. Thus, any
predictive software used to calculate whether reasonable suspicion or
probable cause exists must require the observing officer to input the
specific actions of the suspect as well as his general characteristics.
The software would thus use these specific actions as part of its
analysis, and it would be designed in such a way that it could not
find reasonable suspicion or probable cause-regardless of the
percentage chance of criminal activity occurring-unless the specific
actions were a significant factor in the determination.'
C. Changing the Legal Standards
So far in evaluating the obstacles to adapting big data to
criminal law, we have looked at the potential problems with the
underlying data or the methods used to process that data. In other
words, we have been concerned with shaping the way that
mechanical predictions are made in order to ensure that they are
consistent with the requirements of our criminal procedure
jurisprudence. But even if these problems are solved, we face a
potentially even greater obstacle: reshaping the criminal procedure
jurisprudence so that it can use the information provided by big data.
154. 444 U.S. 85, 87-89 (1979).
155. Id. at 94; see also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)
("[T]he process . . . must raise a suspicion that the particular individual being
stopped is engaged in wrongdoing.").
156. See Ferguson, supra note 12, at 387-88.
157. If the software does not consider individualized suspicion, then police
and judges must use it only as a factor in their analysis. See infra notes 276-282.
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Simply stated, the quantitative results from mechanical
predictions are incompatible with the broad, flexible standards used
by police and judges in the world of criminal procedure.'
Reasonable suspicion and probable cause are standards that have
been intentionally kept vague by the courts. The Supreme Court has
long resisted setting specific probabilities for the flexible concepts of
reasonable suspicion or probable cause,`'9 explaining that it is a
"practical, nontechnical conception" which is "incapable of precise
definition or quantification into percentages."160 The Court explains
to us that the concepts are not "readily, or even usefully, reduced to a
neat set of legal rules" 6 ' and then follows through on this promise by
providing a multitude of messy rules for police and lower courts to
follow. Probable cause is defined as evidence that would "warrant a
man of prudence and caution in believing that the offense has been
committed" or as a "reasonable ground to believe that the accused
[is] guilty."'6 2 Reasonable suspicion is defined as "obviously less
demanding than . . . probable cause,"163 requiring merely "some
minimal level of objective justification."'6 4
These definitions are rather unhelpful in providing guidance or
clarity as to when a stop or a search is appropriate. No lay person
would possibly know what these terms mean in the real world; police
officers and law students must study dozens of fact patterns from
case law to get a sense of what kinds of factors will create reasonable
suspicion or probable cause. Forty-five years ago, one law professor
surveyed 166 federal judges to ask them to quantify the concept of
158. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (describing
probable cause as a "fluid concept ... not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat
set of legal rules").
159. See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1989) ("We think
the Court of Appeals' effort to refine and elaborate the requirements of 'reasonable
suspicion' in this case creates unnecessary difficulty in dealing with one of the
relatively simple concepts embodied in the Fourth Amendment. In evaluating the
validity of a stop such as this, we must consider 'the totality of the circumstances-
the whole picture."' (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417)); Gates, 462 U.S. at 232
(describing probable cause as a "fluid concept").
160. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-71 (2003).
161. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7.
162. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925). In another case, the
Court noted that probable cause "deal[s] with probabilities. These are not technical;
they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
163. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7.
164. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984).
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probable cause, and the results ranged from ten percent to ninety
percent.165 The same group of judges was asked to quantify the
concept of reasonable suspicion, and most judges gave responses
between ten percent and sixty percent.166
This imprecision has its costs: It creates inconsistency from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction and even from judge to judge and it makes
it harder for police to know whether their actions are legal at the time
they take those actions.167 It also forces magistrates and judges to rely
on the subjective descriptions and personal judgments of the police
officers, since these vague standards breed vague descriptions to
meet those standards, such as "high crime neighborhood," "acting
nervous," and "suspicious hand movements." Police officers who
testify to these factors are usually not acting in bad faith; they are
merely trying to find ways to satisfy an ambiguous legal standard.
Perhaps worst of all, the imprecise standards make it difficult to
evaluate the constitutionality of law enforcement actions on a larger
scale. Assume that a study of all probable-cause-based automobile
searches in a jurisdiction demonstrated that 32% of the time, the
police found contraband. Does this mean that the police in this
jurisdiction are following the law or that they are violating people's
rights? Without any quantification of the standard, it is impossible to
tell.
To some extent, the imprecision of these terms was a necessary
evil. If the Supreme Court had instructed police that they needed to
be at least 20% certain of an individual's guilt before conducting a
165. C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof Degrees of Belief Quanta of
Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1327 (1982). The
vast majority of the judges were between the 30% and 60% range-i 6% answered
30%, 27% answered 40%, 31% answered 50%, and 15% answered 60%-still
indicating a wide range of disagreements. Id
166. Id. at 1327-28. Although a few outlying judges (somewhat inexplicably)
answered 0% or 100%, the vast majority of judges were within the 10% to 60%
range: 15% answered 10%, 20% answered 20%, 30% answered 30%, 13% answered
40%, 14% answered 50%, and 5% answered 60%. Id. The study also shows that the
definition of probable cause is not just vague but also likely misleading: It purports
to require evidence sufficient to support a belief that an offense has been committed,
which would seem to mean that it is more likely than not that an offense has been
committed. Id. at 1327. However, the average probability from the judges was
44.5%-below the "more likely than not" standard. Id. at 1332. The First Circuit
agreed with this formulation, holding that probable cause was a lower standard than
preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Melvin, 596 F.2d 492, 495 (1st Cir.
1979). In other words, "probable cause" does not actually mean "probable"; it means
something that is close to probable. See infra notes 242-245 and accompanying text.
167. See infra notes 219-222 and accompanying text.
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Terry stop, the precise quantification would not have helped
individual officers in making their on-the-spot decisions. It makes
more sense for officers to be given some broad guidelines (e.g.,
'more than a mere hunch" or "some level of objective justification
required") and then teach them through training and trial and error
what courts will approve and what they will not (e.g., observing a
suspect leave a known crack house and then run from a uniformed
police officer constitutes reasonable suspicion; observing a suspect
leave a known crack house with no other suspicious behavior does
not). Similarly, telling a magistrate that she should only issue the
warrant if there is a 45% chance of finding contraband would be
unlikely to help her make the decision in a world of clinical
judgments. The magistrate must consider the myriad of subjective
factors from the police officer's affidavit: the credibility of an
informant, the reports of unusual but not blatantly illegal activity,
and so on. Given the messiness of the evidence confronted by police
and judges, a messy standard makes the most sense. Such a standard
allows the decision-makers to follow their intuition and make a
subjective judgment about whether "something seems not right about
this situation" (reasonable suspicion) or "I believe there is a good
chance that a crime has been committed" (probable cause).'6 8 Indeed,
many judges who were polled about percentages for probable cause
and reasonable suspicion in the 1981 survey refused to answer the
questions, arguing that using percentages would be "misleading
because burdens of proof deal with qualitative judgments rather than
quantitative judgments."169
Numerous scholars have also objected to creating specific
quantifiable standards. For example, Professor Orin Kerr argues that
quantification of probable cause would lead to less accurate probable
cause determinations because warrant applications only provide a
limited amount of information, and under the current system, judges
are able to use their intuition to account for the missing facts.'70
Professor Kerr argues that when a judge gets a warrant application,
168. Judges seem to reject quantitative standards as well. Rita James Simon,
Judges' Translations of Burdens of Proof into Statements of Probability, in THE
TRIAL LAWYER'S GUIDE 113 (John J. Kennelly, James P. Chapman & William J.
Harte eds., 1969). In the survey of 400 trial court judges from the late 1960s, judges
were asked whether they would approve of using specific percentages or
probabilities in determining standards of proof, and "[tihe judges were almost
unanimous in their rejection of the proposal for both criminal and civil trials." Id
169. McCauliff, supra note 165, at 1332.
170. Kerr, supra note 146, at 132.
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she only sees the selective facts that the police want her to see:
investigative techniques that successfully found evidence to build
towards probable cause."' But the application will not describe any
investigative techniques that were used that failed to find evidence
nor will it describe any possible investigative techniques that could
have been used that were not used.7 2 In the current non-quantified
world, Professor Kerr argues, judges can use their intuition about
what might be missing from the warrant application, and judges will
instinctively (and perhaps subconsciously) factor that into their
decision.'73 If the probable cause standard became quantified, at, say,
40%, judges would merely calculate the odds (incorrectly) based on
the selective facts in the affidavit and would suppress their natural
intuition to be suspicious about the facts that might not have been
included.
Although Professor Kerr claims his argument is based on the
value of judicial intuition, it is really about the need for
particularized suspicion. He uses an example of law enforcement
who have a well-documented study that 60% of all Harvard dorm
rooms contain illegal drugs, and he posits that police officers attempt
to use that study to get a warrant to search a specific dorm room.7 4 A
judge would rightfully be suspicious of this request, he argues,
because the judge's intuition would make her wonder why the police
have chosen this room in particular-thus leading to the conclusion
that she is not getting the full story from the police."' But this is
merely a restatement of the requirement that suspicion be
particularized-that the affidavit must contain some information that
links this specific suspect to the illicit activity. And as noted above,1 6
this is an important consideration in designing big data's algorithms
for criminal law application-we need to either ensure that the inputs
contained some reference to the individual actions or behavior of the
suspect himself, or allow for police and judges to add in their own
observations of individual activity."
171. Id. at 133-34.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 137-39.
174. Id. at 135-37.
175. Id. at 138-39.
176. See supra Section II.B.
177. Professor Kerr's objection to quantification also focuses on the inability
of judges to use specific numerical probabilities in their decision-making process
and the cognitive biases that would prevent them from using probability numbers
appropriately. For example, Professor Kerr discusses the representative heuristic and
anchoring effects, both of which tend to make individuals misjudge numerical
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A more troubling critique of using predictive algorithms is the
Supreme Court's requirement that the decision-maker use a "totality
of the circumstances" test in determining whether reasonable
suspicion or probable cause exist."' Professor Michael Rich argues
that a predictive algorithm can never determine probable cause on its
own because the algorithm is by definition limited in the factors that
it considers in making its determination. ' 9 A predictive algorithm
might be programmed to consider only a handful of factors, or it
might be programmed to consider hundreds of factors, but it can
never consider every factor that could possibly be relevant to a
probable cause analysis.' A human being at least has the potential to
incorporate new observations, but a predictive algorithm is limited
by its previous programming.'
One response to this critique is that it somewhat misrepresents
what the Court means by "totality of the circumstances." This
requirement does not mean that the decision-maker must consider
every possible factor-that would be impossible for a human being
or a computer. Indeed, courts have noted that once a police officer
has established that probable cause exists, the officer is under no
further duty to investigate or gather exculpatory data.'82 instead,
"totality of the circumstances" means two things.
First, courts should reject a formalistic checklist of factors
(such as the pre-Gates "two pronged" test)'83 and be willing to
consider many different factors in deciding whether probable cause
probabilities, sometimes quite dramatically. This argument has broader implications
for adopting big data's mechanical predictions, which will be discussed in Section
III.B, infra.
178. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983).
179. See Rich, supra note 148, at 897-98.
180. Id. at 897.
181. Id. Professor Rich gives an example of a predictive algorithm that
considers location, time of day, facial recognition technology, prior criminal activity
and other background information, and then adds in the specific behavior that a
certain suspect is approaching multiple people on the street and briefly engaging in a
hand-to-hand transaction with each of them. Id. at 898. The algorithm predicts a
strong possibility of drug dealing. Id. A police officer who investigates notices that
(1) the suspect does not change his behavior when he sees the police officer; and
(2) a person who just engaged in a hand-to-hand transaction with the subject drops a
church flyer on the ground immediately after the encounter. Id The predictive
algorithm did not account for these extra observations, which almost certainly
obliterate the probable cause conclusion, but any human being would be able to
process this new data appropriately. Id
182. See Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 371 (6th Cir. 1999).
183. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 106, 114 (1964).
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exists.'84 Certainly a predictive algorithm can be designed to consider
hundreds of different factors, far more than the average police officer
observing the scene and far more than are typically included in an
affidavit in a warrant application.' It is true that no predictive
algorithm will ever be able to consider every relevant factor, whether
inculpatory or exculpatory. But of course this is also true for police
officers and judges. In fact, predictive algorithms could conceivably
process thousands of different factors, many more than a human
being could.
It is easy to come up with examples of cases in which a police
officer makes an observation that is not programmed into the
predictive algorithm and which dramatically increases (or decreases)
the level of suspicion in a situation, but it is equally easy-if not
easier-to think of examples in which a predictive algorithm
considers relevant factors that an average police officer would never
consider. Many of the factors that human police officers consider to
be relevant may in fact be irrelevant or may be given insufficient
weight or too much weight. And, as many commentators have
pointed out, some of the "intuitions" of police officers and even
judges are grounded in implicit racial bias, making their conclusions
not just inaccurate but also discriminatory.16
Second, the police and courts must also consider potential
exculpatory evidence as part of the totality of the circumstances,
since certain observations or background facts may lower the level of
suspicion.' Predictive algorithms can-and should-be
programmed to consider possible exculpatory evidence as well, and
to weigh that evidence in reaching their conclusions.
In short, quantifying these standards will allow police and
judges to use predictive algorithms, bringing a number of benefits:
the opportunity to reduce discriminatory bias in the system; greater
accountability for police actions; and a higher level of accuracy (that
is, fewer searches of those who are innocent and more searches of
184. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-33, 238-39 (1983). The Supreme
Court noted that a magistrate's job in reviewing a warrant application was "simply
to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set
forth in the affidavit before him, including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of
persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Id. at 238.
185. See Rich, supra note 148, at 895-901.
186. See id. at 897-900; L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the
Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. 1143 (2012); see also supra notes 121-126 and
accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 318 (6th Cir. 2000).
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those who are in fact engaged in criminal activity). There is nothing
inherent about these tests that would forbid courts from adopting
quantitative standards, but courts have been extremely reluctant to do
so."' In the next Part, we will talk about the feasibility of such a
shift.
III. MAKING BIG DATA WORK IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Under current law, a police officer seeking a search warrant
states that she believes there is probable cause to believe that
contraband will be found in the suspect's house, and a judge
appraises that assertion by reviewing and evaluating the facts that the
police officer places in her affidavit, including the credibility of any
informants (and of the police officer herself). The judge then reaches
her own conclusion about whether a person of reasonable caution
would believe that contraband is present at the location.
In a world of predictive algorithms, the police officer will
instead present the magistrate with the output of a computer program
which states that there is a 40% chance that contraband will be found
in the suspect's house. The judge will then examine the algorithm
that was used to ensure that it meets the appropriate legal standards
and will then make a ruling as to whether the 40% prediction is
sufficient to establish probable cause. Depending on the
circumstances, the judge may make a decision based solely on the
output of the algorithm (the "outcome determinative" model), or she
may consider the output of the algorithm as one factor to combine
with other relevant facts (the "formal factor" model).
As we have seen in the previous Parts, in order to reach this
world we must overcome a number of obstacles. First, the judge
needs to know that the computer is not using discriminatory factors
or data that merely reinforces past discrimination. Second, the judge
will need to confirm that at least some of the factors used by the
computer are specific to this particular suspect and that the 40%
figure is not merely derived from aggregate group probability
figures. If the algorithm has no factors that are based on
individualized suspicion, a judge needs to combine the 40% result
with specific facts about this particular suspect in order to arrive at
her own prediction. And finally, we need to know whether the 40%
chance of finding contraband (or whatever number the judge settles
on after factoring in other information) is sufficient to convince a
188. See supra notes 159-161 and accompanying text.
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judge that a person of reasonable caution would believe that
contraband is present. In order to overcome this final problem, courts
must overcome their hostility to quantifying the legal standards that
make up the backbone of criminal procedure.
Thus, in order to create a system where police officers and
judges use data-centric mechanical predictions in making their
decisions, two major changes must occur. First, the predictive
algorithms must be sufficiently transparent o allow judges to ensure
that the algorithm is not relying upon unconstitutional factors, either
directly or indirectly, in reaching its conclusions. Transparency is
also required so that judges can ensure that at least some of the
factors leading to this number are specific to this particular suspect.
And as we will see, transparency is also necessary so that judges can
add additional factors to these algorithms in order to adjust their
results to the facts of a specific case. Second, courts must overcome
their resistance to quantifying these legal standards, so that the
numerical results from mechanical predictions can be applied to
these legal determinations. As part of overcoming that reluctance, in
some cases judges must also become comfortable with manipulating
these probabilities and combining them with other factors in order to
reach their own independent conclusions.
A. Transparent Algorithms and Data Sets
The first step is to convince companies who make these
algorithms to share the details of their operation-if not the source
code, at least the factors that their predictive models consider and the
weight that the models assign to each factor. The transparency
requirement is necessary not only for the algorithm itself but also for
the underlying data sets, in order to avoid the ratchet effect discussed
earlier."'9 Courts need to be able to examine the underlying evidence
being used by the algorithm to ensure that they are not already
tainted by race or by proxies for race-and if they are, the data sets
need to be adjusted in order to remove the taint. Greater transparency
for the data sets will also help with another growing problem with
our increasing reliance on big data: erroneous information in the
government and private databases upon which these algorithms
rely.'9o As we have seen earlier, police are already relying on these
predictive algorithms to direct resources and place certain people
189. See supra notes 134-136 and accompanying text.
190. See Logan & Ferguson, supra note 135, at 13-14.
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under suspicion, so cleansing the algorithms of discriminatory
factors and purging inaccurate information is already long overdue.
Another reason to mandate transparency is to ensure that the
individualized suspicion requirement is met. As noted above,91 some
predictive algorithms may base their conclusions solely on group
membership and external factors, thus violating the legal requirement
that reasonable suspicion or probable cause be based on
individualized suspicion. If the inputs used by the algorithm are open
for the judge to examine, then she can ensure that the conclusion is
based on the appropriate level of individual activity. And if there are
no inputs based on individualized suspicion, the judge must demand
additional facts from the law enforcement officer in order to
establish individualized suspicion-that is, she will be forced to
switch from an "outcome determinative" use of predictive algorithms
to a "formal factor" model.
Unfortunately, up until now, companies have been extremely
secretive about the details of their predictive algorithms, presumably
because they consider these details to be valuable proprietary
information.9 2 The company that provides the Beware software to
police departments does not even allow the police departments to
know the details of the algorithm.93 Recently, the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) had to make a public records request to the
Fresno police, seeking information about the factors used by its
predictive software; the results still did not provide anything like the
kind of transparency necessary to evaluate the constitutionality of the
program.9 4 This secrecy is not limited to private corporations; even
191. See supra notes 145-155 and accompanying text.
192. Jouvenal, supra note 30.
193. George Hostetter, In Wake of Paris, Fresno P.D. Rolls out Big Data to
Fight Crime, CVOBSERVER (Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.cvobserver.com/crime/in-
wake-of-paris-fresno-p-d-rolls-out-big-data-to-fight-crime/4/ [https://perma.cc/7MNX-
ZB8B]. For example, the police were asked at a city council meeting whether a
misdemeanor conviction alone would be enough for the program to conclude that
the suspect was "red," the highest level of danger. Id.
194. Matt Cagle, This Surveillance Software Is Probably Spying on
#BlackLivesMatter, ACLU S. CAL. (Dec. 15, 2015), https://www.aclusocal.org/
mediasonar/ [https://perma.cc/58YX-LATJ]. The result of the public records request
was eighty-eight pages of emails that included lists of "high frequency social media
terms" that could be indicative of criminal activity. Id. (follow "88 pages of
documents" hyperlink; then see E-mail from Media Sonar to Angeline Maclvor (Jan.
27, 2015, 10:43 AM), http://www.aclunc.org/docs/201512-social media monitoring
softarejpra response.pdf [https://perma.cc/93NK-YC3V]).
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private individuals who design these algorithms refuse to disclose
exactly how they work.9
Thus far, this secrecy has not posed significant legal problems,
since predictive algorithms are only being used to direct police
resources. But this is likely to change in the near future, regardless of
whether police and courts begin to use predictive algorithms to
establish legal cause to stop or search. There is growing concern that
the use of mechanical predictions is merely a sophisticated form of
racial profiling,196 and if police want to continue to use algorithms in
any capacity, they will need to reveal (or require their client
companies to reveal) the details of these algorithms. This greater
transparency will not only reassure the public (and the courts) that
the determinative factors used by the algorithm are not related to
race, but it will also lay the groundwork for adopting these
algorithms more formally into the legal system. And, not
incidentally, it may reveal that some algorithms are relying on
forbidden factors in reaching their conclusions, which of course
would require the algorithm to be redesigned with the offending
factors removed. The ACLU's recent public records request, for
example, revealed that one of the Fresno Police Department's
predictive software algorithms used the social media hashtag
#BlackLivesMatter as a risk factor for "police hate crimes."
But requiring the software engineers and statisticians who
design mechanical predictions to reveal the factors being used and
the weights assigned to each factor is only the first step. Modem day
predictive software is not static; the more sophisticated algorithms
will adjust the factors as they go, learning from past experience. As
195. Stroud, supra note 33. In fact, the Chicago Police Department refused to
even reveal the names of the people on their "heat list," because they argue such
disclosure could endanger the safety of law enforcement officers or the general
population. Id. They have revealed some of the factors that they use, such as
criminal records, social circles, gang connections, and whether the suspect has been
a victim of an assault or a shooting. See Eligon & Williams, supra note 36.
Unfortunately, a partial release of certain factors does little to address the
transparency concerns discussed in this Article.
196. See Alexis C. Madrigal, The Future of Crime-Fighting or the Future of
Racial Profiling?: Inside the Effects ofPredictive Policing, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar.
28, 2016, 7:54 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/predictive-policing-video
us_56f898c9e4b0a372181a42ef [https://perma.cc/BK5D-V9JM].
197. Cagle, supra note 194 (follow "88 pages of documents" hyperlink; then
see E-mail from Media Sonar to Angeline MacIvor (Jan. 27, 2015, 10:43 AM),




the algorithm makes thousands or millions of predictions, it will be
told which of those predictions ended up being accurate, and it will
change the weight assigned to each of its factors accordingly to
improve its accuracy. This process, known as machine learning,'"
ensures that the algorithm's mechanical predictions improve with
time, but it makes it even more difficult for the courts to evaluate the
degree to which each factor is relevant to the machine's
conclusions.'99 As one scholar has noted, "[F]orecasting becomes a
distinct activity that differs from explanation. . . . What matters most
is forecasting accuracy. Combining explanation with forecasting can
compromise both."200 In other words, the most accurate algorithms-
those that use machine learning to sift through millions of different
data points-may be the least transparent.20'
However, as we have seen in other contexts in the criminal
justice system, it is possible to overcome these obstacles. A judge
does not really need an intricate understanding of the underlying
code of the algorithm; she only needs to know (1) the factors that the
algorithm used and (2) the historical accuracy of algorithm's
results.2 0 2 Although the experts who design the algorithm need to
consider hundreds or thousands of data points in order to determine
which ones are the most predictive, for practical reasons the actual
algorithm will probably only use eight or nine factors, just like the
sentencing risk assessment tools. 2 03 Thus, the first piece of
198. Machine learning is defined as the following process: "A computer
program is said to learn from experience E with respect to some class of tasks T and
performance measure P, if its performance at tasks in T, as measured by P, improves
with experience E." TOM M. MITCHELL, MACHINE LEARNING 2 (1997).
199. See RICHARD BERK, CRIMINAL JUSTICE FORECASTS OF RISK: A MACHINE
LEARNINGAPPROACH 110-11 (2012).
200. Id. at 111.
201. See Rich, supra note 148, at 886 ("Absent an intentional decision to the
contrary, machine learning tends to create models that are so complex that they
become 'black boxes,' where even the original programmers of the algorithm have
little idea exactly how or why the generated model creates accurate predictions. On
the other hand, when an algorithm is interpretable, an outside observer can
understand what factors the algorithm relies on to make its predictions and how
much weight it gives to each factor. Interpretability comes at a cost, however, as an
interpretable model is necessarily simpler-and thus often less accurate-than a
black box model.").
202. Some would argue that the judge would also need to know the weights
that the algorithm assigned to each factor, so that the judge would be better able to
accurately add in other factors if she was using a "formal factor" model. If so, the
program could be designed to provide explicit percentages for each factor every time
it produces a result.
203. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
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information should be easy for law enforcement to provide, since
presumably it is law enforcement officers who input the data. And
the accuracy of the results should easily be available, since an
integral part of developing big data's algorithms is to calculate (and
then improve on) the accuracy of the predictions that are being made.
Once the judge obtains this information, she would then need
to evaluate (1) whether the specific inputs are proxies for a forbidden
factor, such as race,204 and (2) whether they contain sufficient
particularity to justify the stop, search, or arrest.201 other words,
the judge does not need to know exactly how the algorithm arrived at
its results, only which factors it considered in doing so. The judge
would also have to determine whether the accuracy of the algorithm
is sufficient to meet the reasonable suspicion or probable cause
standard, a question we turn to in the next Section.
And if a judge did want to understand the way the algorithm
processed the inputs, she would not have to personally decipher the
meaning of the underlying source code, much less understand the
evolution of the data in a machine learning environment. Just as
judges hear from experts in a Daubert hearing when they are called
upon to determine the reliability of a new and complex scientific
process, a judge who is called upon to evaluate the methodology and
reliability of a predictive algorithm could also listen to experts
testifying from both sides.20 6
This transparency requirement should be seen not as a
weakness of adopting mechanical predictions but as one of its
strengths. Courts currently rely on a combination of their own
intuition (an internal, subjective algorithm) and experience (an
internal, limited database) when reviewing the decisions of a police
officer (decisions that are made based on a combination of the police
officer's intuition and experience). It has already been conclusively
demonstrated that these intuitions are subject to significant levels of
racial bias,207 but it is difficult for a magistrate to know if (or to what
degree) her own intuition may be suffering from this problem.
Likewise, the magistrate's personal experiences are likely based in
part on problematic data. These hidden biases are very difficult to
204. See supra Subsection H.A.1.
205. See supra Section HI.B.
206. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
207. See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text.
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remove from a person's decision-making process.20 8 With the proper
transparency requirements, however, these biases can be easily
detected in algorithms and data sets of mechanical predictions.
B. Quantifying the Legal Standards
Lack of transparency is not only a problem for those who
collect and process the data, but also for those who use the data-
that is, the judges who apply the legal standards. If the quantified
results from the world of big data are going to be used effectively in
the courts, judges will need to update the legal standards that they
use.
1. Setting a Number
Perhaps the most challenging aspect of adopting predictive
algorithms is determining the quantified percentage to match up with
reasonable suspicion or probable cause.2 0 9 The vagueness of the
current rules obscures any attempt to determine how much suspicion
is actually necessary to reach these standards, and courts have
routinely stated that these standards hould not or even cannot be
reduced to mere numerical probabilities.2 10 But if the criminal justice
system is going to benefit from the increased accuracy and potential
reduction of unfair bias that is offered by predictive algorithms,
courts will need to overcome their hostility to quantification.
Quantifying these standards may lead to other benefits as well.
One positive side effect of greater quantification is the possibility of
creating precise standards for different situations-what Professor
Christopher Slobogin refers to as the proportionality principle.2 1 '
Courts (or legislatures) could craft specific standards for the most
intrusive searches (such as wiretaps or bodily intrusions) and lower
208. See Sendhil Mullainathan, Racial Bias, Even When We Have Good
Intentions, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/04/upshot/the-
measuring-sticks-of-racial-bias-.html?abt-0002&abg=1 [https://perma.cc/6QBT-6BJA].
209. As the use of predictive algorithms becomes more widespread, other
legal standards, such as "flight risk" in the bail context, may also need to be
quantified. See supra Section I.D.
210. See supra notes 159-164 and accompanying text.
211. Christopher Slobogin, Let's Not Bury Terry: A Callfor Rejuvenation of
the Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1053, 1081-85 (1998)
[hereinafter Slobogin, Proportionality Principle]; see also CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN,
PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT 31-41 (2007).
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standards on a sliding scale as searches become less invasive
(searches of homes, searches of cars, searches of offices, frisks,
flyovers, surveilling public spaces).212 Of course, courts and
legislatures already have created these different standards to some
degree,2 13 but the lack of quantification has made this process
confusing and limited the number of "tiers" that can realistically be
created.
Other commentators have argued that quantifying the probable
cause standard would enable courts to adopt a sliding scale based on
the severity of the crime being investigated.2 14 Courts have so far
been reluctant to entertain this idea, generally holding that one
standard should apply across the board to every criminal
investigation.215 But as Professor Craig Lerner has pointed out, courts
have dropped some hints that the probable cause standard should be
lower for police investigating a mass shooting or a kidnapped child
than they would be for a low-level drug possession case.216 Judge
Richard Posner, for example, writing an en banc decision for the
Seventh Circuit, held that probable cause should be "a function of
the gravity of the crime" in the context of exigent circumstances.2 17
212. Slobogin, Proportionality Principle, supra note 211. Professor Slobogin
would also require a greater showing for the most intrusive searches, such as
wiretaps or bodily intrusions; not just a 75% likelihood but also "clear and
convincing proof that the evidence thereby sought is crucial to the state's case and
that the search will be conducted in the least intrusive manner possible." Id. at 1082-
83.
213. See Ric Simmons, The New Reality of Search Analysis: Four Trends
Created by New Surveillance Technologies, 81 Miss. L.J. 991, 999-1004 (2012).
214. See, e.g., Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness ofProbable Cause, 81
TEX. L. REV. 951, 1014-22 (2003); Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause and Common
Sense: A Reply to the Critics of Illinois v. Gates, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 465, 504-
05 (1984); Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45
U. PITT. L. REV. 227, 229-31 (1984).
215. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979).
216. Lerner, supra note 214, at 1015-17. Professor Lerner ultimately
proposes a formula for determining probable cause, similar to the Learned Hand
formula for negligence claims, which takes into account the severity of the crime
and the intrusiveness of the search. Id at 10 19-22.
217. Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1566 (7th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
Other Justices and judges have also hinted at the need for a sliding scale, though the
hints are usually made in dissents. See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the societal interest in searching a
car trunk for a kidnapped child was greater than the societal interest in searching a
car trunk for bootlegged alcohol, and thus he would be tempted to make an
"exception" to the Fourth Amendment in the former case); United States v. Soyka,
394 F.2d 443, 452 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (Friendly, J., dissenting) ("[T]he gravity
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This type of sliding scale would be all but impossible to administer
with the current broad standards; only with greater precision can
courts make meaningful distinctions in different contexts.
Professor Erica Goldberg also points out that the imprecise
nature of the current standards for probable cause tends to create a
very low bar in practice because of the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule.218 Under this exception, even if a reviewing court
finds that a warrant lacked probable cause, the illegally obtained
evidence will still be admissible as long as the officer acted in good
faith-that is, as long as the warrant was not "so lacking in . . .
probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely
unreasonable."219 A vague probable cause standard means that many
warrants that fall short of the probable cause standard will in practice
result in evidence that can be used in trial, as long as the lack of
probable cause was not obvious to the officer.220 If the probable cause
standard were quantified, it could also be enforced with more
regularity against police officers, who would be much less able to
claim the good faith exception when a warrant did not in fact meet
the proper standard.
There is a possibility that if we use actual data to run these
analyses, we will learn that our standards for stops, arrests, and
warrants are embarrassingly low. For example, we may learn that the
standard hit rate for Terry stops is 2% and the average hit rate for
search warrants is 10%-that is, that police officers conduct Terry
stops on individuals with only a one in fifty chance that the suspect is
engaged in criminal activity; and judges are issuing search warrants
even though there is only a one in ten chance of finding contraband
at the named location. We may also learn that these rates vary wildly
depending on the jurisdiction,221 the suspected crime, and (as we have
already seen) the race of the suspect.2 2 2 This information will be yet
another fringe benefit of shifting to a quantitative model. If courts
learn that they are in fact using a 2% rate for reasonable suspicion,
we can have a real debate about whether this number is too low, and
if so, what the number ought to be. Such a debate is nearly
of the suspected crime and the utility of the police action [should be] factors bearing
on the validity of the search or arrest decision.").
218. See Goldberg, supra note 148, at 802-05.
219. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984).
220. See Goldberg, supra note 148, at 804-05.
221. See id. at 802-03.
222. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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impossible to have now because the current standards are shrouded
in intentionally ambiguous legalese.
Once we agree on a number, that number can be imposed
consistently throughout the country. No longer will individuals in the
city be subjected to one standard while individuals in the suburb
receive a more deferential standard. Similar standards will apply to
those suspected of tax fraud as to those suspected of possessing
heroin. This type of equality is simply not feasible under our current
system.
Yet another benefit to quantification will be greater
transparency in the factors that police and courts use to make these
decisions.223 For example, consider the case law surrounding Terry
frisks, which shows courts struggling to determine when there is
reasonable suspicion to believe a suspect is armed. One commonly
cited factor is the type of crime the person is suspected of having
committed. Courts have consistently held that some crimes, such as
robbery,224 narcotics trafficking,225 growing large amounts of
marijuana,226 rape 22 or burglary,228 all involve a high risk of the
suspect carrying a weapon and are thus a legitimate factor in
determining whether the suspect is armed.2 29 But is the nature of the
crime enough on its own to create reasonable suspicion? Is it enough
when combined with one other observation by the police officer,
such as a "furtive move" or a "suspicious bulge"?
Generally, courts will find that if the officer reasonably
believes that the suspect is guilty of one of these "weapons likely"
223. See, e.g., Barry Jeffrey Stern, Warrants Without Probable Cause, 59
BROOK. L. REV. 1385, 1436-37 n.172 (1994) (noting that the Supreme Court "has
not defined [the probable cause] standard in a manner that is particularly
illuminating to those charged with enforcing and interpreting the criminal law");
Goldberg, supra note 148, at 833 (noting that even in the absence of quantitative
evidence, "assigning a numerical value to probable cause can still assist judges in
making probable cause determinations, so long as they appreciate that his number
serves only as a reference").
224. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28 (1968).
225. See, e.g., United States v. $109,179 in U.S. Currency, 228 F.3d 1080,
1086-87 (9th Cir. 2000).
226. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 530 F.3d 1069, 1082-84 (9th Cir. 2008).
227. See, e.g., People v. Shackelford, 546 P.2d 964, 966-67 (Colo. App. 1976).
228. See, e.g., United States v. Mattarolo, 209 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2000).
229. As it turns out, the court's assumptions about which crimes carry a high
chance of weapons being present is sometimes correct and sometimes not. The
Bureau of Justice study revealed that a person committing a robbery does have a
high probability of carrying a weapon (34.5%), but that burglary (4%), sexual
assault (2.9%) and narcotics trafficking (7.8%) do not. HARLOW, supra note 52, at 3.
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crimes, then that belief is sufficient to create reasonable suspicion
that a suspect is armed.230 But surely the risk of a suspect carrying a
weapon is not identical for all five of those crimes-so in theory
courts should require some corroboration in the case of certain
suspected crimes and less (or none) in the case of others. This is not
what happens: Courts merely state that the suspected crime is "likely
to involve the use of weapons"231 and then generally find that the
frisk was justified. Meanwhile, other suspected crimes, such as
passing counterfeit money232 or possession of illegal drugs,233 are held
to not be a legitimate factor-that is, an individual suspected of these
crimes has absolutely no greater likelihood than anyone else to be
carrying a weapon. In reaching these conclusions, courts generally
rely on their intuition rather than any actual evidence that indicates
the prevalence (or dearth) of weapons on suspects who commit these
crimes. And in the absence of empirical evidence, courts create a
false binary categorization: Suspicion of certain crimes generates
reasonable suspicion on its own, while suspicion of other crimes
does not add to the probability of a weapon being present.
Occasionally, courts do venture into the realm of data when
deciding whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause exist, with
decidedly mixed results. In a recent case, the Ninth Circuit attempted
to determine if suspicion of domestic violence was a legitimate
factor in determining whether the individual was armed.234 The
majority held that suspicion of domestic violence did not increase the
likelihood of the suspect possessing a weapon. To support its
conclusion, the court cited studies that concluded that "domestic
violence calls for service account for a relatively small proportion of
the overall rate of police officers murders" and that 36.7% of
domestic violence victims had at some point in their lives been
threatened or harmed by a weapon during a domestic violence
incident.235 The dissent cited FBI studies demonstrating that 33% of
assaults on police officers in a recent year were committed while
police were responding to "disturbance calls," which is "a category
which includes domestic violence calls," and that over a ten year
period three times more police officers were killed responding to
230. Terry, 392 U.S. at 28.
231. Id.
232. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 622, 629 (9th Cir. 1988).
233. See, e.g., Ramirez v. City of Buena Park, 560 F.3d 1012, 1022 (9th Cir.
2009).
234. Thomas v. Dillard, 818 F.3d 864, 878 (9th Cir. 2016).
235. Id. at 880-81.
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domestic violence calls than those responding to burglary calls.23 6
None of these studies establish any quantitative probability that
perpetrators of domestic violence use or carry weapons; they merely
establish the undeniable fact that perpetrators of domestic violence
sometimes carry weapons and sometimes pose a risk to police
officers.237
The court did cite one seemingly useful study: a Bureau of
Justice report covering seven years, which concluded that 15% of
domestic violence attacks involved a weapon.23 8 But this statistic is
almost certainly too crude to be useful. Like "burglary" or "narcotics
trafficking," the crime of domestic violence encompasses many
different kinds of behavior-some of them probably linked to a high
likelihood of weapons possession and some linked to a relatively low
likelihood.2 3 9 In order to effectively use statistics, courts will need
more sophisticated and detailed data, which can be applied to the
facts of the specific case-did the alleged domestic violence occur at
home or in a public place? What percentage of individuals living in
the neighborhood possess firearms? Are the police responding at
night or during the daytime? This type of detailed data needs to be
developed so that it can be used by the courts-without it, courts
may identify these factors as relevant but then apply their own
flawed intuition as to how each factor affects the ultimate question of
reasonable suspicion.
236. Id. at 898 (Bea, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
237. The regular inability of courts to effectively and accurately use statistics
has led some commentators to argue against quantifying legal standards such as
probable cause because judges are not generally skilled at mathematics and
statistical analysis. See, e.g., Max Minzner, Putting Probability Back into Probable
Cause, 87 TEX. L. REV. 913, 951 (2009); Kerr, supra note 146, at 132. However, as
noted below, courts already use statistical evidence to some extent in evaluating
reliability of different tools used by law enforcement officers. See infra notes 238
and accompanying text. Courts also use statistical evidence in evaluating and
applying expert testimony. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 597
(1993). Furthermore, since judges are "repeat players" in reviewing reasonable
suspicion and probable cause determinations, they will develop an expertise with
statistics in the probable cause context as the results of predictive algorithms become
more widespread. See Minzner, supra note 237, at 954-55.
238. Dillard, 818 F.3d at 896-97 (Bea, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (citing CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INTIMATE
PARTNER VIOLENCE AND AGE OF VICTIM, 1993-99 7 (Oct. 2001), http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/ipva99.pdf [https://perma.cc/UH2V-UQ4G]).
239. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged this in its opinion, noting that
"domestic violence calls vary widely in the actual threats they pose to officers and
others." Dillard, 818 F.3d at 881 (majority opinion).
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Of course, even if better data were available, the data would be
insufficient without a quantitative standard to judge it against.
Assume that the court had access to a database that stated that of all
the domestic violence calls in this neighborhood during this time of
day in the past five years, 19.2% of the suspects were armed when
the police arrived. Would that constitute reasonable suspicion? If not,
how close is it-close enough that a suspicious movement by the
suspect is enough to put the risk across the line?240 Without a
quantified definition of reasonable suspicion, judges are unable to
answer these questions, and so instead they create an inaccurate
binary distinction among different types of crimes.
Thus, we need to set a quantified percentage chance for
reasonable suspicion or probable cause. As we saw earlier, judges
appear to have widely divergent views as to this question, with
survey results varying widely but averaging at 30.8% for reasonable
suspicion and 44.5% for probable cause.2 4 1 The Supreme Court has
implied2 4 2-and lower courts have stated24 3-that the probable cause
standard does not mean "more probable than not," which places the
probable cause standard at less than 50%. Most commentators also
agree that probable cause is something close to but just less than
50%,244 while scattered evidence from prosecutors and law
enforcement point to numbers between 40% and 51%.245
240. Here is an example of where Bayesian analysis would be useful-courts
would start with a 15% baseline and then add in other factors to increase or decrease
the likelihood. See infra notes 276-277 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 165-166 and accompanying text. The median numbers
were 30% for reasonable suspicion and 50% for probable cause.
242. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983) (stating that the "[flinely
tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of
the evidence . . . have no place" in determining whether probable cause exists). The
Supreme Court also stated that probable cause represents only "a fair probability"
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found, which implies something less
than 50%. Id. at 246. A plurality of the Supreme Court has stated that probable cause
does not require that the fact being asserted be "more likely true than false." Texas
v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983).
243. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 179 F.3d 265, 269 (5th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Travisano, 724 F.2d 341, 346 (2d Cir. 1983).
244. See Goldberg, supra note 148, at 801 n.62 (listing numerous
commentators, most of whom agree that the probable cause standard is less than
more-probable-than-not); Ronald J. Bacigal, Making the Right Gamble: The Odds
on Probable Cause, 74 Miss. L.J. 279, 338-39 (2004) (setting probable cause at a
range of 40-49% but warning against too much precision); Daniel A. Crane,
Rethinking Merger Efficiencies, 110 MICH. L. REV. 347, 356 (2011) (noting that
practitioners and commentators estimate probable cause to be "in the 40-45 percent
range"). But see Slobogin, Proportionality Principle, supra note 211, at 1082-83
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One way to derive a specific number for these standards is to
reverse engineer the stops and searches that have been approved
under the current law. In other words, we can measure the hit rates
for stops and searches that courts have approved using the traditional
standards. This hould provide us with a number that is at least above
the minimum level of suspicion that is required. For example, if
across the country, courts approve of 100,000 probable cause
searches and police find contraband in 45,000 of those searches, we
can know that generally a prediction which is 45% accurate is at
least high enough to satisfy the probable cause standard.
Unfortunately, there are not many statistics available, but we
do have some actual data from the real world that can be used as a
starting point. For example, the district court in the Floyd case held
that the Teny stops in New York City in the early 2000s were often
conducted without reasonable suspicion. These stops had a 12% hit
rate; thus, the Floyd judge apparently considers a 12% rate to be too
low. 2 4 6 in contrast, we know that before the New York Police
Department began its aggressive stop-and-frisk policy, its hit rate for
Terry stops was a more respectable 21%.247
Reviewing probable cause searches of automobiles provides
some real-world data as to the percentage chance necessary to
establish probable cause. An independent review of the San Antonio
police showed that their probable cause automobile searches resulted
in a hit rate of 35.1%.248 As part of a settlement of a federal civil
(placing the current probable cause level at 50% and the reasonable suspicion level
at 30%). Many commentators agree with the courts and say that probable cause
should not be quantified. See, e.g., Bruce A. Antkowiak, Saving Probable Cause, 40
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 569, 586 (2007) (arguing that "we should fear any attempt to
co-opt mathematical concepts to solve the probable cause riddle"); Grano, supra
note 214, at 469 (arguing for a "commonsense approach," not a mathematical
approach, to probable cause).
245. See, e.g., Lawrence Rosenthal, The Crime Drop and the Fourth
Amendment: Toward an Empirical Jurisprudence of Search and Seizure, 29 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 641, 680 (2005) (quoting a senior Assistant United States
Attorney who estimated the number at 40%); Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and
Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 783 (2003)
(quoting an FBI attorney who set the number at 51%).
246. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 558-59 (S.D.N.Y.
2013).
247. Jeffrey Goldberg, The Color of Suspicion, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 1999),
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/20/magazine/the-color-of-suspicion.html?pagewanted=
all [https://perma.cc/L75B-A7AR].
248. See JOHN C. LAMBERTH, RACIAL PROFILING DATA ANALYSIS STUDY:
FINAL REPORT FOR THE SAN ANTONIO POLICE DEPARTMENT 48 tbl.8 (Dec. 2003),
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rights action in 1995, Maryland State Troopers were required to
report every stop and search of a car on their highways,2 4 9 which
showed a 52.5% hit rate for probable cause searches.250 And a review
of the Florida State Police showed a 38.2% success rate for such
searches.251
Another way to estimate the number is to look at cases
involving alerts by drug-sniffing dogs, which can constitute probable
cause as long as the dog's reliability has been established.2 52 Thus,
when a court needs to determine whether a positive alert by a drug
dog is sufficient to establish probable cause, the Supreme Court has
instructed the reviewing judge to consider the training and past
performance of the drug dog in controlled testing environments.2 5 3
Lower courts have already (albeit grudgingly) approved specific
numerical success rates for drug dogs as sufficient to establish that
the dog's positive alert creates probable cause, holding that accuracy
rates of 50%,254 55%,255 58%,256 and 60%257 were all sufficient to
satisfy the probable cause standard.2 5 8
On the other hand, Professor Max Minzner points out that the
success rate for search warrants, which allegedly use the same
probable cause standard, are much higher-somewhere between
http://www.mass.gov/eopss/docs/eops/faip/san-antonio-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/WDV7-
HS2G].
249. See Gross & Barnes, supra note 56, at 658.
250. Id. at 674 tbl.9.
251. See Minzner, supra note 237, at 925.
252. Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1057 (2013). Of course, the Harris
Court repeated the admonition that the probable cause inquiry in the drug dog
context should be a totality of the circumstances test, including not just the drug
dog's reliability but also whether the handler gave inappropriate cues or whether the
dog was working under unfamiliar conditions. Id. at 1057-58. Below we discuss the
method for courts to combine the specific quantified numbers from tools (such as
drug dogs or predictive algorithms) with other factors. See infra Section III.B.2.
253. Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1057-58.
254. United States v. Donnelly, 475 F.3d 946, 955 (8th Cir. 2007).
255. United States v. Anderson, 367 F. App'x 30, 33 (11th Cir. 2010).
256. United States v. Ludwig, 641 F.3d 1243, 1252 (10th Cir. 2011).
257. United States v. Koon Chung Wu, 217 F. App'x 240, 246 (4th Cir. 2007).
258. See also United States v. Sanchez-Tamayo, No. 1:10-CR-0532-JOF-
JFK, 2011 WL 7767740, at *14 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 28, 2011) (noting that courts have
approved a drug dog reliability rate of "approximately 50%-60%" as sufficient to
establish probable cause). But see United States v. Huerta, 247 F. Supp. 2d 902, 910
(S.D. Ohio 2002) (rejecting probable cause finding even though the drug dog had a
65% success rate).
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84% and 97%.259 Although this dramatic disparity between different
applications of the probable cause standard makes it more
challenging to determine the "proper" number through reverse
engineering, it provides yet another compelling reason to quantify
the standard. Are courts being too lenient in reviewing probable
cause for warrantless searches, or are they requiring too high a
showing for warrant applications? Or perhaps we want two different
standards, one for the on-the-spot decisions made by police officers,
and one for the greater legitimacy and presumed legality of search
warrants? None of these questions can be truly addressed until the
probable cause standard is quantified.
From this brief review of the available data, we can see that hit
rates for stops and searches vary depending on the jurisdiction and
even on the context in which the standard is applied. Thus, if we
want to reverse engineer percentages for reasonable suspicion and
probable cause from the existing standards, we will need data from a
much broader set of studies. However, even the small amount of data
that we have so far confirms the estimates of commentators and
courts that the number for probable cause is somewhere between
40% and 50%.260 There is very little data on the success rate for stop
and frisks that have been approved by courts, but the Floyd case
implies that 12% is too low, 2 6 1 and we know that the number has to
be significantly less than the 40% to 50% range for probable cause.
In one sense, the use of predictive algorithms to establish
reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not so revolutionary. The
Supreme Court has not been averse to using statistical data in other
Fourth Amendment contexts. For example, when the Court was
determining whether a drunk driving checkpoint was "reasonable"
under the special needs doctrine, it noted that the checkpoint resulted
259. Minzner, supra note 237, at 922-23. These rates may be inflated
somewhat because some of the jurisdictions that were studied involved police
officers who did not return their warrants after the search, presumably because
nothing was received. Id. at 923 n.38. Even taking into account this possibility,
warrant success rates still ranged between 46% and 93%. Id. This higher number
does not necessarily mean that courts are setting a higher bar for probable cause in
warrant applications; it could be that probable cause is always set at, say, 40% for
any kind of search, and that most warrant applications achieve a much higher level
of success because law enforcement officers want to ensure they get approved when
they take the time and expend the resources to apply for a warrant. Id. at 922.
260. See supra Subsection II.B.1.




in a 1.6% hit rate for drunk drivers262 and also that similar
checkpoints around the country had a 1% hit rate.263 And as noted
above, lower courts already routinely evaluate the reliability of
certain tools, such as drug dogs, that are used to demonstrate
probable cause.264 The need for courts to use success rates to evaluate
probable cause will only increase as sophisticated investigative
technologies such as facial recognition software or gun detectors
become more widely used. In a sense, predictive algorithms will be
doctrinally no different from these other tools that are already being
used to establish probable cause.
2. Using the Number
Once a number is set for reasonable suspicion and probable
cause, the next step is to decide whether the results from the
predictive algorithms will be determinative of the outcome or
whether they will merely be one of a number of factors used by
officers and judges. As an example, take Professor Andrew
Ferguson's modem-day recreation of Detective McFadden observing
John Terry on the streets of Cleveland:
[McFadden] observes John Terry and, using facial recognition technology,
identifies him and begins to investigate using big data. Detective
McFadden learns through a database search that Terry has a prior criminal
record, including a couple of convictions and a number of arrests.
McFadden learns, through pattern-matching links, that Terry is an
associate (a "hanger on") of a notorious, violent local gangster-Billy
Cox-who had been charged with several murders. McFadden also learns
that Terry has a substance abuse problem and is addicted to drugs.265
Now let us take the next step and assume that the detective
plugs all of John Terry's background information into a predictive
algorithm, which tells him that John Terry has a 1% chance of being
involved in criminal activity at any given time during the day. This
result would certainly not be sufficient to create reasonable
suspicion. Then our modem Detective McFadden could do some
more quick research through the police database and add in some
other factors; for example, that Terry has multiple prior convictions
for armed robbery of commercial establishments, and license plate
262. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454-55 (1990).
263. Id. at 455.
264. See supra note 252 and accompanying text (referencing Florida v.
Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1057-58 (2013)); Goldberg, supra note 148, at 828.
265. Ferguson, supra note 12, at 377.
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data connects Terry to prior commercial robberies in this area.266
This, combined with the earlier information about Terry, tells the
detective that Terry has a 5% chance of being armed with an illegal
weapon at any given time. We still do not have anything like
reasonable suspicion. Indeed, it is unlikely that mere background
information on a suspect could ever rise to the level of reasonable
suspicion-this is akin to saying there are certain people who are so
suspicious that there is always reasonable grounds to believe they are
engaging in criminal activity anytime they are seen in public.2 67
Regardless of how high the prediction is based on the
background information alone, Detective McFadden cannot legally
have reasonable suspicion at this point because he has not yet
considered any individualized conduct on the part of Terry. So
Detective McFadden must incorporate Terry's individualized
conduct into the calculus. As it turns out, the detective sees Terry
pacing back and forth outside a commercial establishment multiple
times, looking in the window, and then conferring with another
individual.2 68 However, the modem-day Detective McFadden has two
options. He can take the 5% chance that Terry is carrying an illegal
weapon and then incorporate that into his own subjective calculation,
combining that factor with his own observations of Terry pacing,
looking, and conferring.2 6 9 Or he can simply input these observations
into the algorithm, which would then automatically combine these
observations along with other data in order to give a percentage
chance that the suspect was in fact involved in criminal activity. The
first is an example of using the predictive algorithm as a factor; the
second is an example of the "outcome determinative" model.
266. Id. at 378.
267. See id. Of course, once predictive algorithms become more
sophisticated, we will have a better idea about how high this percentage could be
based on only background information. However, because of the particularized
suspicion requirement, even if background information alone took us to the required
threshold, reasonable suspicion would still not exist.
268. The actual Detective McFadden used these observations alone to arrive
at reasonable suspicion. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 6 (1968).
269. This is the method suggested by Professor Ferguson, who notes that a
modern-day Detective McFadden can add the personal observations to the
information he gathered from the various police databases to make his finding of
reasonable suspicion "easier and, likely, more reliable." Ferguson, supra note 12, at
377-78. As explained below, infra notes 277-280 and accompanying text, this will
require Detective McFadden to engage in a Bayesian analysis, using 5% as a prior
probability and then adding in his observations to adjust that probability upwards.
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From this basic example, we can see that the "outcome
determinative" option has a number of advantages. First, it will be
simpler for officers and judges to apply, since it will not require
individual officers and judges to process numerical probabilities; the
algorithm will literally do all the processing itself and give the
decision-maker an exact number. The predictive algorithm will
(presumably) use statistics from thousands of previous cases in order
to establish whether the relevant facts create the level of suspicion
necessary to reach reasonable suspicion or probable cause. These
results (and thus the algorithm itself) can be periodically tested every
few months to ensure they are still reliable-and as part of that
testing, the algorithm can be adjusted to give different weights to
different types of data or even to add or remove certain types of data
altogether. Second, the outcome determinative model will minimize
the potentially biased factors that human decision-makers apply in
making these determinations. Both reasonable suspicion and
probable cause require the officer to show specific, objective facts to
support their conclusion,27 0 and forcing police officers to input these
specific facts into the algorithm will make it harder for them to
consciously or subconsciously use factors based on race.
The purely determinative model could even work in cases
where the police officers and judges need to evaluate an informant's
reliability to make a probable cause determination. For example,
assume that a reliable algorithm is created to predict the chance that
drugs will be found at a certain location. It requires five different
variables in order to produce a result, and three of these data points
are particularized with respect to the suspect's observed behavior.
None of these data points are related, either directly or indirectly, to
race, religion, or any other protected class. Assume that a police
officer has personal knowledge of all of these factors and inputs
them into the software, which predicts a 75% chance that drugs will
be found at the location. Given these facts, a court will almost
certainly find that probable cause exists and a search warrant should
be issued.
How would the model work if the police officer does not have
any personal knowledge about the case, and instead her affidavit
quotes an informant who provides the information about all five
270. Reasonable suspicion requires "specific and articulable facts." Terry,
392 U.S. at 21. Probable cause requires "facts and circumstances within their [the
arresting officers'] knowledge." Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959)
(quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
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variables? Once again, all five variables are entered into the
software, and the algorithm predicts a 75% chance that drugs will be
found at the location, assuming that the information is correct. How
can the algorithm (and thus the judge) take into account the
inevitable reliability questions that accompany the use of
informants? In order to preserve the purely determinative model, the
software must be designed so that the credibility of the informant can
be taken into account as part of the algorithm. In many cases, this
would be feasible. Generally, search warrant applications only have a
few different categories of informants: known informants who have
provided accurate information in the past, known informants who
have never provided information before, anonymous informants, etc.
Thus, these specific categories could be inputs into the software, so
that after each relevant factor is entered, the algorithm would ask
about the source of the fact-did it come from personal observation
by the affiant police officer or from an informant; and if from an
informant, how much is known about the informant and his prior
track record?27' These categories would be at least as specific as the
descriptions currently used by police officers in search warrant
affidavits.
Any outcome determinative model in this context will require a
far more sophisticated algorithm, with many more potential inputs
for the different behaviors that might be observed. And in designing
these algorithms, the programmers will need to stay away from the
vague factors that currently cause so much unreliability and are open
to abuse, such as "furtive movements" or "acting suspiciously." 2 72
Other inputs, such as "suspicious bulge" or "nervous behavior,"
which could conceivably refer to specific facts that indicate the
presence of criminal activity, may need to be defined with more
specific language. And the inputs need to include potentially
exculpatory information as well, in order to ensure that the algorithm
complies with the "totality of the circumstances" requirement of the
probable cause determination.273
Given these practical problems, it is unlikely that any
predictive algorithm could ever be designed that contains every
possible type of specific behavior that a police officer might use in
making a reasonable suspicion or probable cause determination.
Some predictive algorithms could be designed in certain basic, often-
271. See Goldberg, supra note 148, at 800.
272. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
273. See Ferguson, supra note 12, at 392.
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repeated scenarios (observations made of individuals exiting
buildings where drugs are being sold, observations made during
routine traffic stops, etc.),274 but the potential range of observed
activity is simply too broad to conceive of a world in which every
possible relevant factor is accounted for in the computer
programming. And in some cases the police officer or judge may
have her own opinion about the reliability of an informant that is not
accurately captured by the five or six traditional categories that are
part of the algorithm's inputs. Furthermore, it may be politically
unacceptable to take human beings completely out of the loop, since
this would require police officers and judges to ignore information
(whether inculpatory or exculpatory) that is highly probative to the
reasonable suspicion/probable cause determination.
Thus, there will be some situations in which the predictive
algorithm is merely one of the factors that the judge considers. In
these cases, the judge will need to incorporate the conclusions of the
predictive algorithm alongside other factors. We will call these
"independent" factors to indicate that they are above and beyond the
factors used by the algorithm. For example, assume that the
algorithm uses five different inputs and predicts a 25% likelihood
that drugs will be found at a given location. The judge also knows
about three independent factors that on their own do not quite rise to
the level of probable cause. The judge will be provided with the 25%
prediction by the software. If the predictive algorithm is meant to be
one of the many factors that she considers, she would then need to
combine the 25% from the algorithm and the unquantified "almost-
but-not-quite" factors from her own judgment. How does she balance
the specific number from the algorithm with her own intuitive
conclusion? Does she have to quantify her "almost-but-not-quite"
conclusion? Assume she can do this (and presumably judges would
get better at this task with practice), and she quantifies her subjective
conclusion at a 30% likelihood. How much weight does she give to
her 30% compared to the 25% from the algorithm?
In order to accurately combine the results from the predictive
algorithm with other factors, we need to take two steps. First, in
order to avoid double counting, we need to separate the factors that
have already been considered by the algorithm from the factors that
have not.275 The transparency that we already require from these
algorithms should make this task easier; the decision-maker will be
274. Id. at 406.
275. See Goldberg, supra note 148, at 833.
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able to review the factors that have already been considered by the
algorithm and then remove those from her own independent analysis.
Second, the decision-maker must use the predictive algorithm
as the starting point and then adjust the percentage chance up or
down as she adds in the independent factors. One method of doing
this is to apply Bayes' theorem, which is a process of combining
known probabilities with new evidence in order to create a new,
updated probability.27 6 The predictive algorithm would provide the
decision-maker with a base rate or prior probability that criminal
activity is present, and then the decision-maker would apply the
probability of criminal activity based on the relevant evidence that
was not considered by the predictive algorithm (known as the
"current probability").277 This extra evidence could include personal
observations on the part of the police officer (assuming those
observations were not taken into account by the algorithm already)
or extra information about the reliability of the informant that was
not accounted for by the algorithm.
As an example, let's return to the modem-day version of
Detective McFadden and John Terry.278 We know from our
algorithm (based only on background information about John Terry)
that there is a 5% chance that Terry is carrying an illegal weapon at
276. For an example of Bayes's theorem being applied in a legal context, see
Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel N. Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict
Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 247, 255-56 (1990).
277. Bayes' theorem can be expressed mathematically as: P = xy/[xy +z(1-
x)]. Id. P is the number we are trying to calculate, known as the "posterior
probability"-that is, the updated probability that a certain fact is true; in this case, it
is the odds that criminal activity is occurring or that contraband will be found if the
search is conducted. x is the "prior probability"-the probability that a certain fact is
true before the extra information is added; in this case, the odds of criminal activity
or contraband that are calculated by the predictive algorithm based on all the factors
that it takes into consideration. y is the probability that if the fact is true, then the
extra information will be present; in this case, the odds that the independent pieces
of information not considered by the algorithm exist because the defendant is
engaged in criminal activity or contraband is present. And z is the probability that
the fact is not true given the extra information; in this case, the chance that given
that all the independent pieces of information are true, there is no criminal activity
or contraband (i.e., there is a perfectly innocent explanation for all of the
independent pieces of information). Obviously the decision-maker will have to
estimate y and z, but this is not too different from what police officers and judges
already do-only in this case they will have a much more accurate base rate to start
from.




any given time. Detective McFadden then observes him pacing,
looking, and conferring and realizes this is exactly the kind of
behavior that he would expect a potential robber to engage in before
committing the crime.27 9 Thus, Detective McFadden estimates that a
person who is planning a robbery is 90% likely to engage in the kind
of behavior that Terry is currently engaging in. And although the
detective realizes that there are some innocent explanations for this
kind of behavior (perhaps Terry is window shopping and then
conferring with his friend about what to buy), the fact that Terry has
repeated this behavior multiple times means that the odds of him not
planning a robbery are only about 10%. Given these estimates, the
detective can complete a Bayesian calculation (or, more likely, input
these estimates into a simple calculator that will then conduct the
Bayesian calculation) and determine that the chances that Terry is
engaged in criminal activity are 32.1%.280 Assuming that courts set
the standard for reasonable suspicion at around 20% to 25%, this
would be sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.
In contrast, assume that our modem Detective McFadden, like
the real-life Detective McFadden, did not have any information
about John Terry's background. Instead, he merely observed Terry's
suspicious behavior. Under Bayes' theorem, our base rate would be
much lower. Perhaps we recognize that this is a high crime
neighborhood, so we know that 1% of the population is carrying an
illegal weapon at any given time. If Detective McFadden makes the
same observations as before and he calculates the same odds of
criminal activity based on those observations, the chances that Terry
is engaged in criminal activity drops to only 8.3%.281 In other words,
the lower base rate from the lack of big data makes the detective's
prediction of criminal activity much less accurate.
Thus, even if predictive algorithms are not outcome
determinative, using a more statistical approach to determine
reasonable suspicion or probable cause will allow police officers and
judges to incorporate more reliable base rates into their calculations.
Predictive algorithms will also help these decision-makers avoid a
279. Some robbers might simply barge in without investigating the location
first, but most robbers would want to take a good look at the location, looking to see
how many people are present, where the cash register or other valuables are kept,
and (in the modem age) whether there are any security cameras inside. See
Ferguson, supra note 12, at 378.
280. Applying Bayes' theorem: P .05*.9/[.05*.9 + .1*(1-.05)] =.321.
281. Again, applying Bayes' theorem: P = .01*.9/[.01*.9 + .1*(1-.01)] =
.043.
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common problem when making predictions: ignoring or
undervaluing the base rate. As can be seen from our above example,
a very low base rate or prior probability for potential criminal
activity means that even very suspicious independent factors might
not result in a very high resulting probability. Studies have shown
that individuals who make predictions frequently undervalue or even
ignore base rates and give too much weight to the independent
factors that they are presented with.2 82 Forcing police officers and
judges to incorporate the base rate in making their calculations
would be another benefit of using a quantified system of criminal
procedure.
Of course, the more we allow the decision-makers to use
independent factors, the more we lose the benefits of predictive
algorithms, such as the increased accuracy and the mitigation of
subjective and potentially biased human input. For example, when
Detective McFadden enters in his own probability estimates into the
Bayesian calculation, he may underestimate the chance that Terry
has an innocent explanation for his conduct because Terry is
African-American, and the detective has an irrational implicit bias
against African-Americans. This would result in a higher prediction
of criminal activity for Terry than it would for a white person with
the same background engaging in the same activity. Thus, we should
design our algorithms to avoid the need for independent factors as
much as possible, since the biases in the algorithms can be detected
and minimized.
CONCLUSION
Big data's predictive algorithms have the potential to
revolutionize the way police investigate crime and the way the courts
regulate the police. For centuries, courts have been crafting legal
standards for police officers who were making clinical judgments
based on experience and intuition. The imprecision and subjectivity
of these legal standards were a necessary evil-they were required
given the subjective factors that were used by the police, but their
accuracy could not be tested, they made the system less transparent,
and they opened the door to vastly inconsistent and frequently
discriminatory results. With the rise of big data's predictive
algorithms, we have an opportunity to increase the accuracy and the
transparency of the way we apply the standards and of the standards
282. Koehler & Shaviro, supra note 276, at 256.
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themselves, making the system more efficient, more fair, and more
open.
In order to reap these benefits, we need to ensure that the
predictive algorithms are race neutral and that they take into account
individual suspicion. This may require new types of algorithms that
are specifically designed for determining reasonable suspicion and
probable cause. It will certainly require that the algorithms be
transparent, so that reviewing courts can understand what factors the
algorithm is using. More controversially, we need to update the
definition of reasonable suspicion and probable cause to include
quantifiable standards. Although courts have shown a strong
aversion quantifying standards in the past, the benefits to such a
change far outweigh the costs. We have seen that some courts,
recognizing this fact, have already started to experiment with using
quantified standards when evaluating some of the factors put forward
by law enforcement officers or when evaluating the tools that these
officers use in determining probable cause.
To be sure, a system of mechanical predictive algorithms and
quantified legal standards will not be perfect. It will probably be
impossible to scrub all residue of racial discrimination from the
existing databases, and police officers and judges will almost
certainly make mistakes when trying to use the predictive algorithms
as base rates and then adding their own independent observations.
And the predictive algorithms themselves will still make mistakes,
and thus will not always be as accurate as we would like. But the
current system includes the implicit and sometimes explicit biases of
police officers and judges; vague standards that can be manipulated
by police officers, which are more or less incomprehensible to lay
people; and accuracy rates (when they can be measured) that vary
wildly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The time has come for courts
to embrace the enhanced precision and transparency that big data has
to offer.
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